Singapore, 1969

102. It is a pleasure for

me and the members of my delegation to associate

ourselves with the felicitations that wave already been

extended to our President on the occasion of her election

to her high and responsible office. To what has already

been said I would like to add my appreciation of the

refreshing note of frankness and realism she injected into

her inaugural address, thus breaking away from the sterile

protocol which prescribes that the President’s address

should be a tranquilizer rather than a stimulant to speakers

that follow. Her pertinent observation that this august body

has long been addicted to what she described as the

“mythology of achievement” [1753rd meeting, para. 54] is

as timely as it is welcome. Since next year we shall be

celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the establishment

of the United Nations, a more critical and realistic

appraisal of our past and present performance should guide

our rhetoric along useful channels when, next year, we

come to consider the United Nations prospects for the next

quarter of a century.

103. The President’s observation about our predilection

for the “mythology of achievement“, I am sorry to say, is

substantiated by an analysis of the agenda now before us.

Out of the 67 items — excluding routine items relating to

elections and administrative and financial questions — 33

have been on the agenda for periods ranging from 5 to 20

years or more. In other words, half of the 67 items are

permanent incrustations on our agenda. Further analysis

reveals that 15 of these have been putting in a persistent

appearance and reappearance for from 5 to 10 years. Eight

others have been relentlessly haunting this Assembly for 15

years, while 10 have been with this Organization longer

than have most of us, having grown up with the Organization

for 20 years or more.

104. I fully appreciate that the grave and momentous

issues that come before this Assembly should not be hastily

disposed of. It is right and proper that some important

questions are worth sleeping on, but 20 years to sleep on

questions makes one wonder whether a metaphor is not

being taken too literally. There may be valid reasons why

many of these problems have become permanent fixtures

on our agenda, but the mythology of achievement is one

important reason why they have achieved near-immortality status.

105. As the President correctly pointed out, there appears

to be a belief among some of us that a resolution adopted

by this Organization is synonymous with a solution

achieved. When this august body is confronted with a

problem, its instinctive reaction is to begin a frantic search

for an appropriate resolution — not a practical solution. Not

problem-solving but resolution-making becomes the game.

This is not to underestimate the importance of resolutions

in any organization. They have a proper function to

perform in any organized activity. However, they have their

limitations too. But it would appear that some of us

harbour the illusion that their powers are unlimited, that

once we have publicly declared our resolve on a matter,

then a resolution can be relied upon, without any further

assistance or action on our part, to resolve the problem for us.

106. The fact that it does not has not shaken our faith in

this particular form of witchcraft. That is why an increasing

number of problems, which we hopefully dispose of each

year with appropriately worded resolutions, reappear,

bloody but unbowed, the next year and succeeding years.

One would have thought that this persistent reappearance

of somewhat battered and battle-scarred resolutions would

have caused us to re-examine, with some scepticism, the

efficacy of the ritual of resolution-making. However, it

would appear that ‘with successive reincarnations of a

persistent resolution our faith in this particular form of

black magic is proportionately reinforced. One could not

otherwise explain the presence of what I would call veteran

questions which do not show signs of ever dying on their

feet. If there are doubts about the efficacy of resolution-making,

it is attributed not to the procedure of resolution-making

but to its phraseology. So, we spend a great

deal of time phrasing and rephrasing resolutions through an

endless permutation of words. We become so preoccupied

with the phrasing of a resolution that the problem which

gave rise to the resolution is lost sight of and even thrust

aside as being something of a hindrance to the formulation

of an agreeable and well-balanced resolution.

107. I would, therefore, humbly suggest that this Assembly

shift its attention from resolution-making to problem-solving.

True, we cannot do without the making and passing

of resolutions. They are the necessary rituals of organized

activity. But resolutions are declarations of intentions and

not substitutes for action. In fact, every resolution which is

not acted upon weakens an organization. Where resolutions

are formulated primarily with a view to pleasing friends or

discomfiting enemies, internationally or domestically, then

resolutions become impediments to action, That is why

attempt must be made to relate a resolution to the realities

out of which the problem first arose. Our failure to do this

explains why some of the resolutions passed by our

Organization have an air of unreality and impracticability

about them. They were never in the first place put through

the sieve of what is possible and not possible; what is

practical and not practical.

108. My observations so far might appear to be unnecessarily

querulous and in accord with the current fashion of

denigrating the United Nations as an expensive white

elephant the world could do without. Let me assure you

that this is not my intention. It is because I sincerely

believe the United Nations is indispensable for the peace

and security of the world, and has such great potentialities

for good that even if the present Organization were to

collapse it would be necessary for mankind to erect another

one, that I experience a sense of exasperation at our

inability to put the existing Organization to better and

more profitable use.

109. I would like to stress here that a vigorous and

effective United Nations is more vital to what are described

currently as the less developed countries, the LDCs, than it

is to the more developed. This is not to suggest that the

developed countries are uninterested in the United Nations

or have no further use for it. But they need its services far

less than we of the less developed countries do. The

advanced countries can and often de operate, in regard to

world affairs, without reference to this Organization. In

fact, the less developed countries should wake up to this

new and significant development in international affairs,

which is that the advanced nations, and in particular the big

Powers, are setting up a separate international network of

their own, where decisions of greater consequence than

resolutions passed by this Assembly are being made and

implemented. While we of the less developed countries

delude ourselves into believing that our perorations, admonitions

and resolutions are influencing the course of

world events, the reality is otherwise. Increasingly, it is in

this separate international network, this new freemasonry

of big Powers and advanced nations, that the significant

decisions on world issues, whether they be political,

economic or military, are being taken.

110. If this is true, as I believe it to be the case, then the

less developed countries, which constitute roughly 80 per

cent of the world’s population and a majority of Members

of this Assembly, should seriously ask themselves what role,

if any, they would be allowed to play in world affairs? Is

there not a real possibility that world problems, a great

many of which would undoubtedly affect our future and

which will have an impact on our domestic affairs, will

more and more be settled over our heads by this free-masonry

of advanced nations?

111. I think this danger is a real one which, in the course

of the next decade or so, could reduce our so-called

sovereignty into a shadow without substance. Maybe some

of us have been prevented from facing up to this harsh

reality by the formal equality accorded to us in this august

Assembly. In theory, we are all equals in this Assembly

regardless of our size, our power, our effective economic

resources and the quality of our respective societies. Our

votes are equal and, therefore, mathematically speaking the

less developed countries should have a preponderance of

influence on world affairs through this Organization. But

we know now that this formal preponderance of power is

largely illusory because there is not the substance of power

behind this preponderance of mere numbers.

112. If I may slightly amend the phrase of the President,

we are also prey to yet another mythology, the “mythology

of the equality of nations”. Perhaps in the early days of this

Organization there was a greater approximation between

mythology and reality. There was a time when the more

advanced nations courted the less developed countries with

greater zeal than they do now.

113. Our exhortations, whether moral or condemnatory,

were listened to by the great and advanced nations with

apparent respect and rapt attention. There were then

solicitous offers of aid and great regard for our sensibilities

and even our whims. All these might have contributed

towards the great illusion that the big and small nations,

developed and less developed countries had an equal say in

the disposal of momentous world issues.

114. I would humbly suggest that the great deference

shown by the high and mighty and the special care they

took to extend to us the courtesies of equality were largely

due to a fortuitous combination of historical needs and

circumstances which, unfortunately, have now largely

vanished. In the years immediately after the end of the war,

the advanced nations, having just concluded a barbaric war,

were morally in a defensive, if not apologetic, mood before

the new nations, which, being new, had no comparable

record. Our moral strictures in regard to the iniquities of

imperialism probably instilled a guilt complex among the

advanced nations. In that frame of mind they were perhaps

a little more disposed towards placating their former

victims and even towards disbursing conscience money in

the form of aid and loans.

115. However, more than two decades have passed since

decolonization began and 20 years is a long time in which

to nourish a guilt complex. During that time, too, some of

the new nations have lost their innocent looks and built up

records which make our moral strictures less compelling to

the reprobates of the old world. We must also remember

that, in the intervening years, a new generation has grown

up in the advanced countries which has no guilty conscience

about imperialism because it did not participate in

its iniquities, and which believes that its guilty elders have

already performed due deeds of atonement. This new

generation of men whose influence is growing in their

respective countries is too interested in fighting poverty in

its own homeland to be concerned with eradicating it in the

third world. It is more interested in financing the second

industrial revolution in its own country than in initiating

the first in the less developed countries.

116. Perhaps the most pertinent reason why the advanced

nations once courted us with such flattering ardour was the

fact of the cold war. Those were the halcyon days when the

advanced nations, in particular the big Powers, believed that

the decisive battlefield of the cold war was the United

Nations. Both communist and anti-communist protagonists

believed that significant defeats and victories could be

secured by appropriate resolutions in the United Nations.

So the combatant who could mobilize the greatest number

of votes for his cause felt he had the edge over his rival.

117. It was not surprising that the less developed nations

were courted and humoured. Their speeches were listened

to with unrelenting attention by the advanced nations, not

so much for the pearls of wisdom which might be cast but

to determine whether it was the East Wind or the West

Wind which was blowing strong in this Assembly. I am not

making any moral judgement. Since the big Powers had

foolishly decided to convert the United Nations into an

arena for their cold war manoeuvres, the smaller nations,

understandably, tried to secure the maximum advantage for

themselves out of a situation which, after all, was not of

their making.

118. All this I am afraid is now in the past. Today a

somewhat different situation confronts the less developed

countries. The techniques of cold war have changed

significantly. The advanced countries and the big Powers no

longer need this Assembly — at least in the way they once

did — to resolve their differences or pursue their major

national objectives. The votes and the support of the less

developed nations are therefore not that vital; hence our

leverage against them is far weaker than it was two decades

ago. It will become even more feeble unless we of the less

developed nations begin a brutally frank reassessment of

our real position and our real influence. I do not propose to

suggest the lines along which that reassessment should

move. First, it is too complex and also too delicate a

question to be thrashed out in a single speech or even a

succession of speeches.

119. Second, I myself have as yet no specific and clear-cut

proposals as to how the less developed nations can carve

out for themselves a meaningful role in world affairs, other

than by passing resolutions which, like Omar Khayyam’s

philosopher, come out by the same door as in they went.

Perhaps when we meet next year to commemorate the

twenty-fifth year of the United Nations it may be worth

our while to undertake a positive and constructive approach

as to how small and developing nations can play a

satisfactory role in the shaping of world affairs.

120. But of one thing I am fairly certain. We cannot rely,

as we once did, on the advanced nations to be all that

concerned with our salvation. The advanced nations may be

taking a short-sighted view of their real interests, for in this

shrunken and interdependent world the widening gap

between rich and poor nations cannot, in the long run,

make for a peaceful, progressive or even a prosperous

world. Even if the advanced nations are prepared to lend a

helping hand this will, at best, be only a supplement to

what we should do for ourselves.

121. We have before us a number of undoubtedly important

issues. Most of these have been with us for a

considerable time and my Government has, on previous

occasions, expressed its considered views on those specific

topics. I shall not, therefore, tax your patience by repeating

them. They remain conveniently enshrined in the reports of

this Assembly and all I therefore need do is reaffirm our

attachment to views already proclaimed. I should, however,

like to make particular reference to three of them, not only

because my Government is specially concerned with them

but also because they involve grave issues of peace and war

for the world. These are the war in the Middle East, the war

in Viet-Nam and the manifestations of racialist imperialism

in South Africa, South West Africa and Rhodesia. My

Government has already made public its stand on these matters.

122. In the case of the Middle East conflict my Government

believes that no country, however big or small, should

be denied the right to exist; that the fruits of conquest,

however achieved, should not be forcibly converted into

fruits of war, and that peoples who have lived for long as a

settled community in a territory should not be made into

homeless wanderers. My Government believes that the

Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967

[242 (1967)] provides the basis for a peaceful solution and,

further, that the continued resort to force would only make

more difficult the resolution of that conflict.

123. In regard to Viet-Nam, our belief is that the future of

that country, for which World War II never really ended,

should be settled by the people of that nation through the

free expression of their wishes along the lines of the Geneva

Agreement of 1954.

124. As regards white racialism in South Africa and

Southern Rhodesia, its arrogance and confidence have

grown rather than diminished, despite the fierce postures

taken in this Assembly. Something more compelling than

the ritual of resolutions in this Assembly is required to

persuade the white Aryans of South Africa and Southern

Rhodesia, not that their doctrine is immoral — for they well

realize this — but that their long-term security and prosperity

would be in jeopardy were they to persist in their racial

arrogance. Until the white Aryans of South Africa and

Rhodesia can be convinced that racialism carries within

itself the seeds of their own destruction, through the

mobilization of black Africa, no less determined to end

racialism than the whites are to sustain it; moral exhortations,

by themselves, will not materially alter the present

convictions of the white racist minorities. If a determined

minority can impose its immoral doctrine on millions of

people, then it should be possible for a determined majority

to convince the minority of the utter futility of persisting

in its present course.

125. That is why my Government remains unconvinced

that these and other important issues will be settled wholly,

or even primarily, by the speeches less developed countries

make or the resolutions they endorse in this Assembly. The

ultimate and effective decisions must be taken by the

parties directly involved in such conflicts and by the big

Powers, which, we all know, have a special position in

regard to those conflicts. The big Powers and some of the

advanced nations are not innocent bystanders in regard to

conflicts involving less developed nations. The capacity of

the developed countries to determine at least the pitch and

intensity of expensive, mechanized, modern wars in other

peoples’ territories is, if not decisive, at least considerable.

126. The independent role that less developed nations can

play in these kinds of situations is, at best, marginal. Before

we of the less developed countries can play a more

independent role in world affairs, we must first build up the

political, economic and technological resources of a truly

modernized community. That is why calls to less developed

countries to jump into stormy seas to rescue friends, as

often embodied in Assembly resolutions, remain in fact

unanswered. When it comes to the decisive moment of

plunge, the potential rescuer makes a realistic appraisal of

his capacity to stay afloat himself, let alone rescue friends

True, there have been cases where valour has had the better

of discretion, with the result that very good friends, of

both advanced and less advanced nations, have regrettably

and irretrievably been lost.

127. In making this realistic, if somewhat unpleasant,

assessment of the capacity of under-developed nations to

play a role in world affairs, I am not suggesting total

incapacity or permanent impotence. On the contrary, I

believe that we have the potential to exert a substantial and

beneficial influence on the course of human affairs, because

we constitute the overwhelming majority of mankind. If we

can develop that potential, which in effect means undertaking

the difficult and painful process of modernization,

then, collectively, what are now the under-developed

nations can pass meaningful resolutions. The price of

modernization will be a heavy one, because the major

burden of the cost must be borne by us.

128. I do not propose to try your patience further by a

dissertation on modernization through self-help and mutual

aid between developed and under-developed nations. I

should like, however, to end with the warning that the

affluent countries have developed a more philosophical

attitude towards the widening gap between the rich and

poor nations. Maybe they hope that this widening gap itself

will afford them protection against the consequences of a

largely impoverished and desperate third world. But we of

the less developed countries cannot afford to take that

philosophical attitude, because the rate of progress — economic,

social and technical — in advanced countries is

reaching geometric proportions; and if we remain quiescent

in the face of this, then the difference between us and the

advanced nations may be as qualitatively different as that

between Stone Age man and modern man.

129. The validity of this contention is not something

which will be put to the test only many generations from

now. I think it will be put to the test when those now in

their teens in less developed countries reach maturity by

the end of this century. Whether this emerging generation is

put into new bondage will depend, to a great extent, on

what those of us now in charge do or fail to do.

130. That, in conclusion, is the measure of the real and

significant problem before the less developed countries.