General Debate, session 37

Cambodia, 1982

Speaker
Prince NORODOM SIHANOUK 6 statements
Post
Prime Minister
Session
37th, 1982
Member state
Cambodia
Length
3,986 words

Statement as recorded

This is the sixth time in a quarter of a century

that I have had the honor to come to this rostrum

to defend before the representatives of Member

States the interests of my country and its people.

2. Today, as on the last occasion when I

addressed the Security Council, in 1979,'

following the occupation of Kampuchea by the

armed forces of the Socialist Republic of Viet

Nam, it is for the very existence of my country

as a free and sovereign State that I seek to be

the spokesman before the Assembly.

3. I wish at the outset to express my most

respectful good wishes to the President of the

Assembly. May I be permitted to salute very

respectfully Mr. Kittani, and congratulate him

very cordially on the outstanding leadership he

provided at the thirty- sixth session of the

General Assembly and on his great ability, sense

of fairness and integrity I extend respectful

good wishes to the Secretary-General, whose high

sentiments and deep devotion to the cause of

justice and peace we all admire.

4. May I be permitted also to salute the

delegations present here, amongst which it is my

honor and privilege to count many faithful

friends, in the name of my country, its Coalition

Government and all patriots who struggle in

acutely difficult circumstances, but with fierce

determination, for the liberation of their

country.

5. Contrary to certain false allegations,

our Government is not a Government in exile. All

its members live and fight in the interior of our

national territory, side by side with our heroic

fighters. For, despite the efforts of a powerful

Vietnamese army in control of Kampuchean

territory, we have liberated and solidly held

large zones not only near the Thai frontier, but

also in several regions of the south-west and the

north-east of our country.

6. Last July I myself visited my compatriots

in three liberated zones, travelling by car, on

Coot and on elephant, deep into the interior of

our country. Everywhere I was welcomed by

well-armed and disciplined military units and by

tens of thousands of civilians, amongst whom I

had the satisfaction to note an impressive number

of little children.

7. My country and its Coalition Government

wish to express their profound gratitude to the

United Nations for having, since 1979, rejected

the pretensions of the regime installed by a

foreign Power in our capital, a Power which seeks

to obtain the seat of Kampuchea in the Assembly's

midst. Here everyone —including those who support

its candidature to this seat—knows that that

regime has no real existence, that it is under

the control of Vietnamese occupying authorities

and that it depends in everything and for

everything on the protection of two foreign

nations.

8. To recognize the puppet regime of Phnom

Penh would in fact mean: first, accepting the

permanent foreign domination of our country,

which has been a Member in its own right of the

United Nations since 1953, and reducing it to the

position of a colony of Powers which shamelessly

violate the Charter of the United Nations and

treat with contempt its resolutions seeking the

immediate and unconditional withdrawal of

foreign forces from our territory; secondly,

giving to many other countries—not necessarily

all of the third world—that are also occupied by

foreign forces the sad certainty that they are

forever condemned to an anachronistic

domination; and, thirdly, augmenting the state of

tension and risk of conflict in our region.

9. Kampuchea occupies on the geographical

plane a strategic position of primary importance.

I have sought in the past to make it a buffer

State between two categories of State with

opposing ideologies. We now know that the ravages

of war have extended from Viet Nam to Kampuchea

and they threaten to spread even further to the

west.

10. Independent, non-aligned and neutral,

accepting no foreign bases on its territory, my

country could have constituted a major element in

the peace not only of the peninsula, but of the

totality of southeast Asia and even of East

Asia. On the contrary, a Kampuchea becoming a

colony and a military base for two expansionist

and hegemonist Powers constitutes a menace, as

the years of the future will prove, to the

stability, peace, security and progress of

nations and peoples of the entire region and

could well provoke an armed conflict with

incalculable consequences between the great

Powers whose interests are in conflict in Asia.

11. As members of the Assembly know, I have

often been the object of verbal attacks, of a

mixture of contempt, sarcasm and abuse on the

part of the leaders of Hanoi and their allies. I

shall not reply to those attacks but shall limit

myself to recalling that in Asia there certainly

did not exist, before 1970, a non- communist

leader who was more sincerely a friend of Viet

Nam than I was, one who rendered spontaneously

and voluntarily so much important help to the

Vietnamese patriots of North and South in their

struggle for independence in their country.

12. After the invasion of my country by the

army of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam I

reminded the leaders of Hanoi of the assurances

of eternal gratitude and promises of

unswerving respect for the independence,

neutrality and territorial integrity of my

country given many times orally and in writing by

the leaders of Hanoi, to remind them of their

commitments.

13. At the end of 1979 and the beginning of

1980 I wrote three long letters to my friend

and former companion-in-arms , Pham Van Dong,

head of the Vietnamese Government, to propose

bilateral negotiations between his Government

and myself, either in Hanoi or in any other town

of his choice, in order to resolve peacefully the

differences between our two nations. I stated in

my correspondence that, in the event that the

Socialist Republic of Viet Nam would agree to

restore to Kampuchea its independence and its

right to self-determination, our Government,

which would result from the popular consensus,

following free elections held under international

control, would not fail to establish, on a basis

of equality, co-operation and friendship with a

Viet Nam that is a neighbor and a brother.

14. I waited in vain during the three years

for a sign of good will on the part of Hanoi,

accepting even accusations made by certain

compatriots about my pro-Vietnamese indulgence.

To my patient efforts in seeking a peaceful

solution and re-establishment of mutual

confidence by complete neutralization and

international control and guarantees for my

country, the leaders of Hanoi replied, or caused

replies to be made, that they would not negotiate

with a man who no longer represented anything ,

who was politically finished , and that the

situation in Kampuchea was irreversible .

15. Yet today as yesterday, I feel no hatred

towards Viet Nam. 1 have never ceased to

recognize that the geographical position of our

two countries makes them neighbors to the end of

time and that they are, because of this,

compelled to understand each other and to listen

to each other. This understanding, however, can

be established only between equals and not

between servant and master.

16. The present Government of Hanoi does not

accept this analysis. It has chosen to forget,

and how quickly, the repeated help that our

people and I myself have rendered during a

crucial period to the people of Viet Nam in their

struggle for independence and reunification. It

has also very quickly forgotten—this is even more

serious—that the support ft has received in this

struggle from a large part of the international

community resulted from the fact that it appeared

to be the innocent victim of colonialism and

imperialism. Today, this very Viet Nam, restored

in its territorial unity and independence,

indulges, in its turn, in imperialist and

colonial rule. It goes so tar in its arrogance

as to make serious threats against some of the

neighbouring countries, which quite rightly are

concerned about its expansionism.

17. We have all noticed that in his last tour

of Southeast Asia, the Minister for Foreign

Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam has

permitted himself to issue, in respect of certain

countries that he has visited, threats thatare

hardly veiled, simply because these countries ask

Viet Nam to withdraw its troops from Kampuchea

and to let the people of Kampuchea regain their

right to self-determination.

18. The Vietnamese Minister has accused

certain Governments of the member countries of

the Association of South East Asian Nations of

interfering in the internal affairs of

Kampuchea, but, as we know, it is Viet Nam which

has interfered in a shameless fashion in our

internal affairs, occupying our country with

large numbers of troops and appropriating to

itself material parts of our national resources,

whereas ASEAN has only asked our occupying Power

to let Kampuchea become yet once more the master

of its own destiny.

19. President Ho Chi Minh, at whose funeral I

was the only head of State present to pay my

respects, loved to say that nothing is more

precious than independence and liberty . This

adage, one now sees, is to be applied, according

to his successors, only to their own country,

which arrogates to itself the right to confiscate

the independence and liberty of its immediate

neighbors—our country, Kampuchea, and an

unfortunate Laos—whilst waiting to attack other

nations which may be militarily weaker.

20. In so far as Kampuchea is concerned, it

is clear that the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam

seeks to retain it indefinitely under its heel by

the intermediary of a puppet Government which can

refuse it nothing.

21. It is in the face of these facts and in

this dramatic context that I find myself

compelled to commit myself to a tripartite

coalition at this juncture and to join, pacifist

though I am, the armed struggle so that our

country may one day become once more master of

its destiny.

22. The United Nations was good enough to

adopt, in 1979, 1980 and 1981, precise and

unambiguous resolutions showing the way to be

followed to resolve with justice the problem of

Kampuchea, a problem which would not exist but

for the greed of Viet Nam on the political and

territorial planes.

23. In 1981 the International Conference on

Kampuchea was held in New York, under the

auspices of the United Nations; the Declaration

and resolution of the Conference^ conform to

equity, justice and the Charter of the United

Nations, as well as to the best interests of

Kampuchea and Viet Nam and to those of the

peoples of the entire region.

24. The Coalition Government of Democratic

Kampuchea cannot accept, any more than our

compatriots, that another conference should be

arranged by the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam,

which profits from the support of the Soviet

Union and the allies of that great Power. The

primary effect of such a further

conference—where, naturally, the puppet regimes

of Phnom Penh and Vientiane would be seated—would

be to sidetrack the situation in Kampuchea by

declaring it finalized and thereby causing to be

recognized de the regime of Heng Samrin, docile

creature of Hanoi. Obviously there can be no

question that Democratic Kampuchea and

peace-loving nations committed to freedom and

justice would fall into such a trap.

25. If the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, a

Member of the United Nations, really wishes to

contribute to the return of peace and stability

in the region, there is no other solution but to

respect United Nations resolutions and

participate in the future work of the

International Conference on Kampuchea. It is not

in any way sufficient to announce, as was done

recently by Viet Nam, a partial retreat of its

forces of occupation in Kampuchea in order to

lessen the tension in our region; the reality of

such a retreat has not been proved. As a matter

of fact, many fresh troops were recently sent

from Viet Nam into Kampuchea to reinforce the

Vietnamese occupying forces.

26. I repeat that only the complete

withdrawal of Vietnamese forces of

occupation—withdrawal to be followed by free

elections held under the control of the United

Nations permitting the whole of our people to

designate their deputies, senators, ministers,

head of State and political regime—would

constitute an honest solution to the problem of

Kampuchea. Aslong as the Socialist Republic of

Viet Nam refuses to take its troops out of

Kampuchea, my Government will oppose with all its

force the politics of fail accompli. We know all

too well that for the past three years our

country has been gagged, that all political

opposition is repressed and that opponents are

sent to prison or disappear without leaving a

trace.

27. Chemical weapons, especially toxic gas,

are frequently used against the resistance

fighters and the inhabitants of villages which

have escaped Vietnamese control. The forces of

occupation appropriate to themselves ever more of

the natural riches and goods of Kampuchea and

send a growing number of Vietnamese immigrants to

colonize our fertile lands and rivers rich in

fish but from which the legitimate owners have

been driven away.

28. Vietnamese propaganda has strenuously

sought —and not without success—to make Western

observers who are permitted to enter Kampuchea

believe that this country, occupied but not

submissive, enjoys a freedom and a well-being

which it has not known for a long time. This is

but a facade denounced by other journalists who

have been in the region and who, in spite of

multiple obstacles placed in their way, have been

able to make in-depth studies of the real

position.

29. I have been telling representatives that

the only option which we have is to take up arms

to protect our national sovereignty. I know that

here and there people mock our struggle and say

that we are too weak to challenge the powerful

Vietnamese expeditionary forces. Weak or not, we

have the sacred duty to struggle with all our

strength against the occupying Power.

30. I would not predict a victory in either

the short term or medium term, but I can assure

representatives that we shall battle on to the

end, without hate but with an unbreakable

resolution. Those foreigners who impose their

domination on our country and exploit it to their

profit will perceive early or late that there

will never be peace and that the land of

Kampuchea will heat up ever more under their feet.

31. We are not making war on the Vietnamese

people. We are fighting for peace and the

restoration of independence and freedom to our

country which is now reduced to slavery. We do

not want a Pax Vietnamica or a Pax Sovietica

but simply a peace of free men.

32. We ask nothing from others. We ask but

restoration of our national sovereignty and our

territorial integrity; and once that is achieved,

we solemnly commit ourselves to living in perfect

peaceful coexistence with all our neighbors—and

first amongst them Viet Nam—as with all other

countries which respect us, no matter what their

political and social systems may be. Is that an

unreasonable demand, an impossible pretension?

33. We proclaim solemnly before the Assembly,

in conformity with United Nations resolutions,

that as soon as Viet Nam has totally withdrawn

its troops from Kampuchea all will be possible in

friendship between our two countries.

34. We are ready to sign with Viet Nam a

treaty of peace and non-aggression implying

recognition and respect for the territorial

integrity of the two neighbouring nations within

their present frontiers. This is a just proposal

that I make today to the leaders and the people

of Viet Nam in the name of our Coalition

Government. I am satisfied that, if they would

but listen to this appeal of reason, the people

of South-East Asia, as well as the peoples of the

whole world, would feel the most genuine

satisfaction—for not only would peace and harmony

return to the Indo-Chinese peninsula but also

potential major conflicts would thereby disappear.

35. Unfortunately, the reality is that the

Socialist Republic of Viet Nam is far from

seeking to explore the way of reconciliation and

peace. It seeks to propagate a very curious

concept of an international conference charged

not to solve the situation in Kampuchea, but to

consider the security, the peace and neutrality

in South-East Asia .

36. May I draw to the attention of the

representatives now present that the

international conference proposed by the Vietnamese

would logically mean side-tracking and avoiding

the central issue of Kampuchea, because

delegates to such a conference would find

themselves, right from the start, required to

recognize, , the puppet regime of Heng

Samrin, functioning under the orders of Hanoi and

Moscow.

37. It seems evident to me, as it must seem

to you, that no country which loves justice and

freedom could, without reneging on its ideals,

participate in such a meeting which has as its

only aim to serve the egotistical interests of

two Powers in their expansionist and colonialist

enterprises.

38. Who, in effect, menaces the security and

peace and the stability of South-East Asia, if it

is not Viet Nam which, with the powerful help of

the Soviets, has stationed its forces in

Kampuchea, menacing henceforth Thailand and other

peaceful member countries of ASEAN, as well as a

number of countries further away?

39. It must be clear that any conference

interested in peace and stability in South-East

Asia must necessarily resolve, as a priority,

the situation in Kampuchea . This done, my

country, having found its independence and its

freedom to act, there would remain no problem to

resolve in South-East Asia, since no country

adjacent to or a neighbor of independent an/1

neutral Kampuchea has anything to fear from us.

40. ASEAN, to which I must render my most

profound homage for its political sense and its

courage, has refused with reason to sign the pact

of non- aggression that Viet Nam proposes. Such a

pact would have the same disastrous effects as

that which was signed in Munich in 1938 by

Chamberlain and Daladier in the hope—tragic

illusion—of mollifying Hitler and Mussolini. Such

a pact would be but the prelude to further

aggression between countries and peoples who

subscribe to it.

41. Representatives will understand why no

international conference is imaginable if the

first item on the agenda does not deal with the

situation in Kampuchea and does not seek to put

an end to the occupation and colonization of my

country by Viet Nam, with the multi-faceted

support of the Soviet Union. If this problem is

not dealt with and resolved, there is really

nothing to discuss, there is nothing to be done

but to bend the knee before the diktat of Hanoi

and Moscow.

42. It would be lamentable to participate in

a Vietnamese conference which will have present

as representatives of Kampuchea the regime of

quislings of Phnom Penh put in place by the

Vietnamese leaders and protected by the powerful

Vietnamese army of occupation.

43. To accept the Vietnamese fail accompli in

Kampuchea would be to accept the law of the

jungle. This law is already in force in many

countries which tragically today are reduced to

slavery by a great Power.

43. States Members of the United Nations—at least

those for whom the principles of freedom,

independence, justice and peace still

matter—must have at heart, I am sure, the need to

cry Halt to the Vietnamese occupation and

colonization of Kampuchea by adopting the

resolutions and in taking measures which would

require Viet Nam, which we once respected, to

return to a sense of honor which, we hope but

momentarily, it has so singularly failed in.

46. We are very conscious of our limitations

and of the fact that our own problems concern us

in such absolute priority that we cannot pretend

to concern ourselves with the problems of others.

But as, of course, our country has always been a

Member of the United Nations, I trust I will be

permitted to indicate briefly our position on

certain problems of major, importance.

47. I would at the outset express the sincere

gratitude of my country and our people to

nations which have generously welcomed our

refugees and, in the very first place, to the

Kingdom of Thailand, which has carried a very

heavy burden in the name of duty to humanity in

granting a haven of refuge and protection against

threats to hundreds of thousands of our

compatriots who fled slavery, misery and death.

I thank equally, with all my heart, the other

countries of ASEAN for their active support and

their diplomatic and other assistance to our

cause.

48. I salute also the other States which have

welcomed a large number of our refugees and

permitted them to escape despair, as well as the

many countries which have made generous gifts and

given assistance from which our compatriots have

benefited and benefit today. At the same time, I

salute and thank the Secretary-General, the

International Red Cross, UNICEF and other

humanitarian organizations for all they have

done, are doing and will be doing for our

refugees and other compatriots in their need.

49. I respect the Vietnamese people, dragged

against their will into a colonialist adventure,

although for many years now they have found

themselves plunged into difficulties without

number and from all sides and of all kinds, which

their Government is in any event obliged to

recognize, and which have provoked the tragic

exodus of hundreds of thousands of boat people .

50. I do not consider that I have a right to

ask the Western Powers to cease providing

humanitarian aid to our neighbors, innocent

victims of the dreadful conduct of their

Government. But I have the right, in the name of

the people of Kampuchea, to ask all countries

which are not accomplices of Vietnamese

colonialism forthwith to cease granting to the

regime of Hanoi financial, economic and material

aid which risk being used not to help the unhappy

people of Viet Nam, but inevitably to encourage

their leaders to persevere in their enterprise

against my people and my country.

51. We reaffirm our total solidarity with our

brothers and sisters, the Afghan people, who like

us are involved in a struggle to enable their

country to exercise again its inalienable right

to self-determination. We support equally the Lao

people, our brothers and sisters, who desire to

recover Lao independence and liberty.

52. We reaffirm our total solidarity with our

brothers and sisters, the Palestinian people, who

are suffering appalling trials for the rebirth of

their country. We continue to recognize

officially the Palestine Liberation Organization

[PLO] as the legal representative of the

Palestinian people and nation.

53. We firmly support our brothers and

sisters, the Korean people, in their legitimate

aspiration for a reunification of their country

now divided against its will, and we warmly

support the wise and patriotic proposals of

Marshal Kim Il Sung, President of the Democratic

People's Republic of Korea, so that the

reunification may take place through a peaceful

and independent process.

54. It is our ardent hope that the two

brother countries at present in conflict with

one another, Iraq and Iran, will seek a peaceful

solution to their problems and realize, in peace,

their necessary reconciliation.

55. Deeply moved by the unmerited disasters

and innumerable loss of human lives which Lebanon

has suffered—a State which heretofore was the

Switzerland of the Near East—it is our ardent

hope that its sovereignty and territorial

integrity will at last be respected and the

foreign armed forces will withdraw without delay,

leaving the Lebanese people the opportunity to

resolve their problems alone.

56. We renew our fraternal solidarity with

the valiant people of Namibia who, under the

leadership of the South West Africa People's

Organization [SWAPO], are waging a just struggle

for national liberation against the colonialist

and racist regime of Pretoria.

United Nations official records are in the public domain worldwide under administrative instruction ST/AI/189/Add.9/Rev.2.

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