Singapore, 1996

Last year we met in a

celebratory mood. But after every party comes the sober

dawn, and we now face the sombre reality that the United

Nations risks marginalization. Its role in the twenty-first

century is not to be taken for granted.

The sad truth is that today the United Nations plays

little or no practical role in the management of the most

important political, strategic and economic questions of our

time. But this was not always the case as we recall: the

United Nations played a significant role in easing the pangs

of decolonization. Even at the height of the cold war, the

United Nations was not an unimportant instrument through

which the super-Powers could manage regional proxy

conflicts and, on occasion, even direct nuclear

confrontation.

This contrast with its past should lead us to regard the

present and future of the United Nations with deep concern.

We can no longer postpone a critical examination of

fundamental issues. It is for this reason that my delegation

is especially gratified to see Malaysia occupy the

presidency of the General Assembly at this important

turning point for the future of the United Nations. We in

the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

know Tan Sri Razali Ismail for his commitment and clear

thinking.

I can do no better than echo what you, Mr. President,

said about reform in the first plenary meeting of the

General Assembly at its fifty-first session; we entirely agree

with you. The interminable debates about the need for

United Nations reform have led to precious little real

reform. These debates have served to conceal and not to

clarify basic issues. An important theme has been the need

for greater efficiency; we all support that. No one can

seriously argue against more productivity, better

management and less waste. The key question, however, is:

efficient to do what?

What kind of United Nations do we really want and

for what purposes? We all know that the purposes of the

United Nations are enshrined in the very first Article of

the Charter. Nevertheless, the answers are not self-

evident. We all know that the first of the United Nations

purposes is

“To maintain international peace and security”.

But what does this mean? The more extravagant post-cold

war hopes for a new Agenda for Peace have proved

illusory. The failure of the United Nations Protection

Force (UNPROFOR) raises troubling questions about the

role of the United Nations after the cold war. The

essential lesson to be drawn from UNPROFOR’s fate is

not merely how the Security Council became a political

theatre to assuage the domestic concerns of some of its

principal members; nor is it only the truism that the

United Nations could do no more than what its principal

members allowed it to do. The real tragedy for the United

Nations in Bosnia is that when the major Powers finally

decided to get serious about what they determined to be

a threat to international peace and security, their preferred

instrument was clearly not the United Nations.

Again, we all agree that poverty breeds conflict, and

that the gap between the rich and poor is widening. Yet

the Agenda for Development has been mired in

theological arguments about the definition of sustainable

development. Now I do not mean to suggest that clarity

of objectives is unimportant. But the real issues are not

that complicated, because what the least developed most

urgently need is not intellectual sophistry but help: help

to build the institutions and formulate the policies that

will allow them to plug into the global economy. The

United Nations has not adequately met these challenges.

The stalemate in reform is not merely because of the

difficulty of the questions or because of conflicting

interests. Of course, the issues are thorny and differences

in interests inevitable in any system of sovereign States.

That is precisely why we need the United Nations, as the

Charter envisages, “to be a centre for harmonizing the

actions of nations”.

Why then is the United Nations today less able to

perform this vital function? In my view, it is because it

has been reluctant to adequately confront the implications

of the two most significant developments of our time.

First, the end of the cold war and, secondly, the

emergence of a truly global world economy. The

conjunction of these two events is changing the manner

in which States relate to each other in unprecedented and

fundamental ways. Yet these developments are at best

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only imperfectly reflected in the United Nations. And any

international organization that divorces itself from

international realities has no future.

The most obvious consequence for the United Nations

since the end of the cold war has been the great increase in

membership. But the change in the nature of Members has

occasioned less comment. In 1945, small States, which I

define as those having a population of 10 million or less,

formed 59 per cent of a United Nations with 51 Members.

Half a century later, in 1995, small States by the same

definition formed the same percentage of a United Nations

of 185 Members. And 23 of the 26 countries — more than

88 per cent — that joined the United Nations after 1989

were also small States. I expect that when the United

Nations membership expands further, as it surely must, the

majority of new Members will also be small States.

This is because changes in the structure of the

international economy engendered by technological

advances and the end of the cold war have made size less

important in the determination of a country’s viability.

What matters most today is not merely the extent of a

State’s frontiers or the wealth of its resources; the key is

the ability of a State to integrate itself as part of a network,

and size is irrelevant to this.

The most important international networks are not

composed of relations between States. The critical networks

are increasingly defined by transnational patterns of

relationships between cities, regions and subregions that

may only imperfectly fit in with the formal political

boundaries of individual States. This again makes a

country’s size or its resources less important than its ability

to access these networks.

It is a fact that many small countries are also among

the less developed. This is not surprising given the skewed

distribution of international wealth. But the significant point

is that to be small is no longer an automatic or fatal

disability. It can even be advantageous. This has

emboldened many to seek self-determination. And since the

same trends have loosened the ability of capitals to control

their peripheries, many have succeeded.

Where economics leads, politics inevitably follows.

Paradoxically, the political consequence of increasing

economic integration of a globalized world economy is a

certain loosening of political bonds. We see the effects of

this most dramatically in the physical breakup of large and

diverse States. But these are exceptional situations. Even

when, as is more usual, the formal political boundaries

remain intact, the ability of capitals of large and relatively

homogeneous States to impose a single direction over all

their constituent parts is clearly diminishing. Power is

devolving everywhere. This trend is a new international

reality.

I do not wish to overstate the argument. So long as

sovereignty remains the chief organizing principle of the

international system, the exercise of force cannot be

discounted in inter-State relations. In war, size is not

entirely irrelevant, even though technology has made it

something less than the totally decisive factor it was in

the past. But war is an extreme condition of international

relations. Under normal conditions, the very notions of

power and wealth are being redefined and becoming more

diffuse, their different dimensions less prone to be

focused in just a few world capitals. Hierarchy is still a

fact of international life. But what does it really mean to

be a “great Power” at the end of the twentieth century?

The very phrase today sounds anachronistic.

Bereft of a simple strategic enemy, the post-cold-war

foreign policy decision-making of the major Powers is

increasingly localized, with domestic politics exercising

greater impact. The policies of big Powers in a globalized

world, where the economic and other interests of their

component parts may be at odds with those of the capital,

is becoming less coherent. The very notion of a single

national interest is becoming somewhat ambiguous.

All this is making it increasingly difficult for even

the biggest countries to routinely bring their power to

bear in an interdependent world, where an attack on an

opponent may well damage their own interests. Wielding

power is becoming more unpredictable even for those

who control its greatest instruments. It is not an accident

that the big Powers are now somewhat more cautious

about exercising power nakedly save in exceptional

circumstances and against States that are marginal in the

global economy.

I do not mean to suggest that the traditional notion

of international relations structured by the interactions of

a few big Powers pursuing their individual national

interests is entirely obsolete. But it is surely an inadequate

description of the world today. The balance of military

power is still important. But the strict distinction between

high politics and low politics on which the traditional

balance of power rested is increasingly blurred.

Now, all this ought to make a consultative,

multilateral process more attractive to everyone, and not

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less attractive. Alas, this is not so. Herein lies the root of

the problems of the United Nations. All States, big and

small, are adjusting to the changing international system.

Indeed they have no choice. But not all are choosing to do

so in or through the United Nations. In the United Nations,

most of the Powers that we traditionally designate as

“great” have reacted with varying degrees of disquiet to

these new international realities.

Some, troubled by their decreasing ability to control

events even within their own frontiers, are frustrated at their

inability to impose their order on what is perceived as a

recalcitrant, unfamiliar and intrusive Organization. Others

see a threat to their position and prestige. Psychological

adjustments are always the most difficult to make. It is thus

not surprising that in the United Nations their reflex

reaction has generally been a stubborn defence of the status

quo.

In discussions on United Nations reform, this simple

fact is all too often obscured by the use of arcane and

convoluted jargon. I am encouraged, Mr. President, by your

reputation for plain speaking, for pulling aside the veil of

rhetoric and letting the truth be known. If the United

Nations is to be marginalized, let the responsibility clearly

be seen to lie where it should. This is most evident in the

two most critical and inter-related areas: Security Council

reform and finance.

Discussions on Security Council reform have

emphasized the Council's size and composition, and in

particular the possibility of the admission of new permanent

members. There is a wide consensus that in the event that

there should be agreement for an increase in the permanent

membership, an increase only by industrialised countries

would be unacceptable. Many countries agree that Japan

and Germany should become new permanent members

when consensus is reached on the expansion of the Security

Council. Nevertheless, crucial ambiguities remain about

whether new permanent members should have the veto. It

is especially difficult to imagine major Powers allowing

developing countries the veto over their policies. And

therefore the stalemate continues.

There is also widespread agreement that Security

Council reform should comprise a comprehensive package

that would include changes in the working methods of the

Security Council in the direction of greater transparency

and participation by the membership of the Organization as

a whole. But the permanent members have been reluctant

to admit any but the most cosmetic of changes to the

Security Council’s working methods. Yet this is the most

critical aspect of Security Council reform for the small

States which form the majority of United Nations

Members. Small countries do not aspire to permanent

membership. But as the principal organ for the

maintenance of international peace and security, the

Security Council’s working methods and its decision-

making processes are of vital and legitimate interest to

them because they can have direct a impact on their

security.

One of the most important and innovative proposals

currently on the table is for a reinterpretation of Article

31 of the Charter. This would allow greater participation

by non-members in informal Security Council

consultations when questions affecting them are being

considered. It was extremely discouraging that this

modest proposal was categorically rejected by almost

every permanent member. Indeed, most refused even to

seriously discuss it. It must surely be a basic principle of

elementary justice that parties most directly affected by a

particular situation should be allowed to present their

views directly to the body that will have the most

influence over any action that the United Nations may

take on that situation. That is in fact the precise reason

why Article 31 was included in the Charter in the first

place. The intention was clearly to reconcile great-Power

leadership with the principle of sovereign equality.

Informal consultations are an innovation that has

evolved over the years. All the most important decisions

the Security Council takes today are made informally by

permanent members. Even the participation of non-

permanent members in the real decisions is sometimes

more symbolic than significant. Formal meetings are

clearly only a choreographed ritual to set the final seal of

approval. A reinterpretation of Article 31 would not

require an amendment to the Charter, nor would it mean

that non-members must participate in all informal

consultations. It is therefore no real threat to the authority

of the permanent members; it is just an important reform

that would undoubtedly enhance the legitimacy, and hence

the general acceptability and effectiveness, of Security

Council decision-making by bringing the process more in

tune with the temper of our times.

I do not wish to be misunderstood. I am not

suggesting that the size and composition of the Security

Council are unimportant. I understand the merit of the

claims for new permanent membership that have been

advanced by both industrialized and developing countries.

Singapore supports the expansion of the Security Council

by up to five new permanent members as part of a

14

comprehensive package that would, among other things,

include the consequent adjustment of non-permanent

membership to maintain a balanced ratio. But given the

profound changes in international relations that are under

way, refusing to seriously discuss anything but membership,

and even that with critical ambiguities, would be akin to

trying to prepare the United Nations for the twenty-first

century by applying a nineteenth-century model of great-

Power politics to it.

The same resistance to seriously engaging the

legitimate interests of the small-State majority of United

Nations Members also underlies the financial problems of

the United Nations. No one disagrees that the key reason

for the cash flow problems of the United Nations is the

failure of Member States to pay their dues in full and on

time.

There are various reasons why various Member States

have not met their legal obligations. Some are poor. But no

one has ever suggested that the largest debtor lacks the

capacity to pay. Its argument is that its assessed

contributions must be reduced because the state of its

domestic political consensus does not permit it to sustain its

current share of the United Nations budget. The financial

burdens, it is consequently argued, ought therefore be more

widely spread. I do not lightly dismiss such arguments.

They reflect the increasing difficulty of defining and

exercising great power that I had earlier called one of the

new international realities. I can therefore sympathize with

such arguments. But it is not politically acceptable to pick

and choose which of the new realities to emphasize when

useful, and which to ignore when inconvenient.

Several permanent members have complained of the

financial burdens they bear, and have sought to spread them

more widely. But there has never been any suggestion by

any of the big Powers that their control over critical United

Nations expenditure decisions, in particular peacekeeping

expenditures, should be proportionately diffused among the

majority of small countries which would be expected to

take up the financial slack that they want to discard. All the

permanent members have been reluctant to allow anything

more than the most superficial reexamination of their

authority or their relationship with the membership as a

whole. Discussions on the role of the General Assembly,

which is the only universal and truly representative United

Nations organ, have touched mainly on peripheral issues,

such as the timing of plenary meetings, the duration of the

general debate and the organization of the General

Assembly’s work.

No one should disagree that to put the United

Nations on a sound financial basis ought to be a common

endeavour. We certainly do not. But it must really be a

collective enterprise involving fair give and take. Political

resistance coalesces because it has become clear that the

majority are expected to give, while the few only take.

Resistance is underscored by the historical fact that the

percentage financial contributions of all permanent

members, except France, have been steadily reduced over

the years while their privileges have not. Resistance is

strengthened by the recollection that the United Nations

has in fact repeatedly made the financial adjustments

asked for, but as yet without any appreciable change in

the payment record of the largest contributor.

I do not suggest that this situation is the result of a

deliberate policy, since no country takes any pleasure in

being unable to pay its dues for whatever reason. But it

is politically incongruous and basically unfair to ask the

majority to assume a greater share of the financial

burdens without at the same time being prepared to allow

them any more authority over the most important

expenditure decisions. It is untenable to have an almost

total separation between the authority for launching

peacekeeping operations and how and who should pay for

them. The United Nations is the only organization in

which a small number of Members run up the largest bills

while everybody else pays them.

The stubborn defence of the status quo is all the

more striking because no one has asked for anything more

than the most modest and incremental adjustments to the

relationship between the General Assembly and the

Security Council to allow the general membership a little

greater participation in and shared responsibility for the

decision-making with the greatest budgetary implications.

Singapore is, of course, a small State, and I do not

claim to be a disinterested party. As a small State, we are

passionately concerned about and vitally engaged in the

future of the United Nations. However, our drawing

attention to the real obstacles to reform is not just in the

interests of small countries alone.

I have suggested that the paradoxical political

consequence of a globalized world economy is a certain

enhancement of centrifugal tendencies everywhere. A

universal international organization to play an integrative

role is therefore needed by everyone, big and small, if

this is not to lead to conflict. Only the United Nations can

play this role, and if it did not exist, we would have had

to invent it. But the United Nations can play this

15

integrative role only if the legitimate aspirations of the

small States are not ignored and if the majority do not

become increasingly alienated from the very Organization

that purports to represent them.

Some may dismiss the distance between the rhetoric

and the reality of the big-Power attitude towards United

Nations reform as simple hypocrisy. I do not accept such a

simplistic explanation. I can empathize with the far more

complex and wrenching psychological adjustments that the

big Powers need to make. The big Powers must summon

the political courage to begin this process and embrace the

reality of, and necessity for, change. I appeal to them to

work with us, the small-State majority, to make this truly

a United Nations for all — all — its Members.

Prestige does not depend solely on privilege, and

power shared is not power lost. The new international

realities are making a zero-sum conception of State power

obsolete. A credible United Nations, one that is not

regarded as the mere tool of its largest Members, will be a

more effective instrument for the foreign policies of all its

Members, big and small.

In closing, let me say that my delegation looks

forward to close collaboration with you, Sir, and all other

members over the next year to advance a collective vision

of a truly representative, effective and united United

Nations for the twenty-first century.