Cyprus, 2005

Before proceeding

with my remarks, I wish to begin by indicating that my

delegation fully subscribes to the statement delivered

by the presidency of the European Union.

At the outset, Sir, let me express my sincere

congratulations to you on your election to the

presidency of this session of the General Assembly and

my sincere gratitude to Mr. Jean Ping, President at the

fifty-ninth session, for his tireless efforts during a very

crucial year for the United Nations.

With the end of the summit, we have entered a far

more crucial phase, that of the follow-up and

implementation of its outcome and the furtherance of

the progress achieved, especially in terms of those

targets which have been subject to an enforcement road

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map since the Millennium Summit. The realization of

the content of the summit outcome document

(resolution 60/1) in conjunction with reforming the

United Nations, may very well decide the

Organization’s relevance and standing in decades to

come and with it the fate of our attempts to render

effective multilateralism the cornerstone of

international order. Beyond the wide spectrum of

issues covered in the summit’s outcome document, we

must not lose sight of those realities on which the

United Nations must — and is expected to — remain

primarily focused. For these, we must go back to the

genesis of the Organization. In the wake of the Second

World War, a vision emerged to establish a system of

collective security and institutionalized mechanisms

that would ensure the maximization of conflict

prevention and the minimization of the duration and

impact of a conflict.

Not only has the new century inherited many of

the challenges and problems of the previous one, but

new scourges have emerged that jeopardize the

legitimacy and the very existence of our system of

collective security. These require an urgent response

from the international community through an action-

oriented strategy encompassing the appropriate

institutional framework, appropriate decision-making

mechanisms and the efficient implementation of our

commitments. Fulfilling our pledges in a timely

manner is not a responsibility applicable only to

traditional security threats. Terrorism, transnational

crime and many other security deficits require our full

attention in the form of elaborating result-oriented

action plans. Regarding, for instance, weapons of mass

destruction, although we are aware of the inextricable

link between disarmament and non-proliferation, we

have not yet been able to strike the kind of balance that

would allow us to pursue them equally and

simultaneously. And while we have identified

underdevelopment and poverty as key enemies of

stability, this realization is not yet adequately reflected

in our actions.

The assessment of the current state of the world

through the comprehensive report of the Secretary-

General on the work of the Organization, which we

have before us in document A/60/1, leads to the

conclusion that long-standing conflicts, with all their

ramifications, remain a primary source of concern for

the international community. Africa is a prime example

of this. Today more than ever, and rightly so, it remains

at the core of our mobilization. Our endeavour to make

a difference there in terms of conflict resolution,

peacekeeping and peacebuilding and fighting poverty,

underdevelopment and deadly diseases will be the

litmus test of the effectiveness of our commitment to

meet the Millennium Goals.

The Middle East is another test case. In recent

weeks it has been proven that reciprocal gestures have

the capacity to construct common ground, even where

that does not seem on the surface to exist. Israel’s

withdrawal from Gaza and parts of the northern West

Bank is an important development that should lead to

the implementation of the Quartet’s road map. Israel’s

paradigm of removing settlers is one to be followed by

other occupying Powers using settlers as a means of

warfare. Even though the security situation is still

fragile, and even though the political negotiation might

not always be moving forward, the parties are offered a

closed course in the form of the road map, which has

the potential to steadily lead to progress. Furthermore,

we firmly believe that the gathering momentum would

be aided by strict adherence to international law and

international humanitarian law, including the 4 July

2004 advisory opinion of the International Court of

Justice on the construction of the barrier.

Let me now turn to the Cyprus problem. Almost

18 months have elapsed since the April 2004 referenda

on the Annan plan. Let me stress once more that in

rejecting that plan the Greek Cypriots rejected neither

finding a solution that would reunify Cyprus nor the

urgency of achieving this. They rejected that particular

plan because it did not provide for and could not bring

about the reunification of the country, its society, its

economy and its institutions. During this time we have

not remained idle. Our priority has been to revisit the

content, product and shortcomings of the last

negotiation process which led to the referenda.

Simultaneously, emphasis was placed on dispelling

certain misconceptions that were solidified as a result

of the last negotiation process.

One such misconception was that our constant

and keen pursuit of peace and of achieving the

reunification of our country has been diminished or

that we have come to terms with the unacceptable

division of our country which was imposed in 1974 by

the invasion and occupation of 37 per cent of our land.

The second misconception concerns the role of the

United Nations in offering and continuing its good

offices mission mandated to the Secretary-General by

12 05-51226

the Security Council. The Secretary-General’s mandate

for the good offices mission has not come to an end but

has entered a new phase with the end of the referenda.

Regardless of its level of activation at different times,

this mission is an ongoing and sustained process.

Through it we expect the Organization to broker a

negotiated settlement without any arbitration. The

active contribution of the European Union in this

regard would be catalytic. Only an agreed settlement

endorsed by the leadership of the two communities can

be put to referenda. The timetable for seeking a

solution should genuinely and exclusively be

determined by the parameters of the Cyprus problem,

and as such there should be no deadlines embedded in

the process that are dictated by exogenous elements.

We remain committed to holding negotiations under

the umbrella of the United Nations and to working for

the creation of those conditions that will render fruitful

negotiations feasible. In this context we have been

implementing substantial practical measures on the

ground with the aim of building confidence and

promoting the economic development of the Turkish

Cypriots. We hope that enhancing cooperation between

Greek and Turkish Cypriots will be conducive to

making progress on different aspects of the Cyprus

problem, especially the elements composing its

humanitarian dimension such as the fate of missing

persons and the welfare of those in enclaves.

The divisive character of the most recent plan,

which essentially led to its rejection, epitomized its

remoteness from the essence of the problem. Another

source of great concern is the apparent willingness of

actors involved in the process to concede a

disproportionately large number of politically driven

demands at the expense of those principles that should

govern the solution. It should be clarified that a

settlement should be formulated on the basis of the

concerns and expectations of the people of Cyprus as a

whole and should not aim at accommodating the

interests of foreign Powers on the island. The Cyprus

problem is at a critical juncture. Time may not be

working in favour of reaching a settlement, but we

must keep in mind that we cannot afford any more

failed attempts. We should be particularly cautious but

resolute. Revival of the talks requires thorough

preparation and an honest assessment that the prospect

of success is at least credible. This in turn requires

confirmation that the Turkish political aims have now

changed and that Turkey has reconciled itself to the

fact that achieving a settlement is synonymous with the

concept of a single, reunified State.

We have always hoped that Turkey’s accession

course to the European Union would radically shift its

mentality, a prospect that would mark the single

biggest development in the Cyprus problem in decades.

The fulfilment of Turkey’s obligations emanating from

its accession course to the European Union will ipso

jure rid the Cyprus problem of some of its most

intractable components and facilitate a settlement.

Simultaneously, the existence of the United Nations

negotiating framework cannot serve as a pretext for

postponing or refusing to fulfil these obligations.

For our part, we remain committed to a bizonal,

bicommunal federal Cyprus in line with what we

consider to be the pillars of the survival of this model

of settlement — the high-level agreements, United

Nations resolutions, international law and the acquis

communautaire. We anticipate that these will safeguard

the right of all Cypriots to preserve their fundamental

interests while simultaneously taking into account their

most basic concerns.

Aside from procedure, the time has come to go

back to basics and realize that as long as the basic

aspects of the problem are not truly tackled, progress

will be difficult. Without dealing with the core

components of the problem by putting an end to the

military occupation, the massive violations of human

rights and the plight of the refugees and by effectively

addressing the question of settlers deliberately and

illegally transported to the occupied part of the island,

there can be no solution. At the same time, for progress

to be realized on the ground all secessionist attempts

on Cyprus must be terminated immediately, in

accordance with the relevant Security Council

resolutions, and a single vision based on the unification

of the island must prevail.

Unfortunately, however, we have not been

moving closer to these imperatives. Instead we have

been witnessing for well over a year a tendency to

entrench the faits accomplis on Cyprus, particularly

through an outburst of illegal exploitation of Greek-

Cypriot-owned property in its occupied part.

In establishing the new constitutional and

institutional set-up we should avoid artificial structures

that will require an abnormally long transitional period

to be absorbed by the people and the institutions at a

great socio-economic cost. We visualize that seeking a

05-51226 13

settlement will increasingly centre on and fall under

the establishment of a functional, working democracy

that does not require exceptionally taxing efforts for

basic governance. We also visualize that with Cyprus’s

membership of the European Union taking solid root, a

settlement would encompass an integration of the

currently occupied area to the characteristics of a

European society and the standards of the acquis

communautaire in full harmony with the rest of the

island, and leading to a process of osmosis there.