General Debate, session 54

Afghanistan, 1999

Speaker
Abdullah Abdullah 7 statements
Post
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Session
54th, 1999
Member state
Afghanistan
Length
2,120 words

Statement as recorded

Allow me to join the

speakers preceding me to congratulate you, Sir, on your

election as the President of the General Assembly at this

session, the last of the present century. You surely are

well versed in this high office through your experience

with the United Nations, which will make of the

centennial transition the launching platform for ever-

more-fruitful future undertakings.

As we embark on the next century, the survival of

the United Nations as an effective global institution

comes into question. Can its role develop in the dawn of

a new era? Or will it be more like a brilliant sunset?

From the League of Nations to the United Nations, we

have continuously pinned our hopes on the United

Nations system, looking forward to a promising world

ruled by law, governed by justice and blessed with peace.

However, the wide-ranging challenges — from

questions relating to the maintenance of international

peace and security, the eradication of poverty, sustainable

development, economic growth and social progress to

globalization in meaningful terms — all yet to be met and

require firm resolve and certainly not mere rhetoric.

As crises continue to unfold throughout the world,

we must ask, and answer, certain important questions.

Why are threats to international peace and security

variably defined and selectively determined from place to

place? Why are State violators of the United Nations

Charter and international law, including the principle of

non-interference, not brought to justice? Why are the

instigators of “ethnic cleansing” and the perpetrators of

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genocide and of crimes against humanity not checked? Why

is the fight against terrorism and narcotics so limited? And

finally, where and when will gender apartheid come to an

end?

We are convinced that those challenges and crises can

best be dealt with if the United Nations actively functions

within a framework similar to that of a state system. In this

context, the United Nations Charter serves as an explicit

and clear reference outlining the rights and responsibilities,

in their entirety, of the Member States.

The advent of the new millennium marks the closing

of the twentieth century. This is a time for the United

Nations to pause and assess the gains and losses, and the

successes and setbacks, it has experienced since its

founding. The United Nations cannot truly embark on the

next millennium until it has conclusively addressed the

unfinished items on its agenda and the many existing global

threats. One item on — and perhaps at the top of — that

agenda, though it is far from finalized, relates to Pakistani

hegemonic actions and that country’s collusion with

Talibanism in our region.

The Pakistani-Taliban occupation of land in

Afghanistan represents a clear breach of a fundamental

principle of international law, namely, the inadmissibility of

the acquisition of territory by force. It is trans-border

aggression. In addition, as the report of the Special

Rapporteur (E/CN.4/1999/40), states in paragraph 18, the

Taliban

“continue to pursue policies which are in conflict with

international human rights standards by which

Afghanistan is bound as a party to the major

international human rights instruments.”

Furthermore, the Taliban has committed repeated war

crimes and crimes against humanity, including forced

deportation; the forced displacement of hundreds of

thousands of people; the separation of thousands of men

from their families; the widespread burning and leveling of

houses and entire villages; the systematic destruction of the

agricultural base and the irrigation systems, resulting in the

loss of crops due for harvesting; and the execution of a

scorched-earth policy. This has been particularly true, on a

massive scale, in the Shamali Plains, following the July 19

Tashkent meeting of the group of “six plus two”, and just

this week in Khoja Ghar, in north-eastern Afghanistan.

Their policies of genocide, gender apartheid, trafficking of

women and girls, “ethnic cleansing”, religious and sectarian

extermination, rigid interpretation of religion, and the

pursuit of a military solution spell out the Taliban actions

in Afghanistan. They persist in their extremist agenda and

advocacy of terrorism. The increase in drug production

and trafficking, the Talibanization of the region and their

denunciation of the international community continue

unabated.

In sum, over 50 per cent of the Afghan population

has been placed under virtual house arrest, and the entire

population remains terrorized by the Taliban. The

international community is greatly disturbed and

concerned by the ominous nature of the Taliban agenda.

The responsibility of the much-discussed yet

unresolved turmoil in Afghanistan continues to lie with

the Pakistani leadership. Pakistan remains a proponent of

arm-twisting, both nuclear and conventional, in South

Asia. Afghanistan’s Pakistani-dictated position of

subordination, through the Taliban, has long undermined

the peace process. Pakistan remains implacably opposed

to the formation of a fully representative, multi-ethnic

government in Afghanistan, insisting that the Taliban not

relinquish power but gain further control. To this end,

inter alia, thousands of Pakistani military personnel,

members of the paramilitary, former commissioned

officers and thousands of recruits and “volunteers” from

Pakistani religious schools have been trained and

dispatched into Afghanistan for what has been called a

“jihad”.

The remarks made on 30 July 1999 by Ambassador

Lakhdar Brahimi, head of the United Nations Special

Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA), regarding the presence

of thousands of armed Pakistani nationals fighting

alongside the Taliban, provide credible testimony.

In this context, perhaps the article by retired

Brigadier Usman Khalid, published in the Pakistani daily

The Frontier Post of 29 September 1999, just three days

ago, best spells out the Pakistani security dilemma in the

form of a bold confession. It states that

“the armed forces of Pakistan have been steadfast in

playing their role in safeguarding the security of the

country [Pakistan]. They have sought to safeguard

the nuclear deterrent of Pakistan, resisted pressures

to withdraw support from the mujahidin in Kashmir,

and have been steadfast in their support to the

Taliban in Afghanistan. All of these are of vital

importance to Pakistan’s security and survival.”

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In fact, it is the intervention of Pakistan in

Afghanistan, its support for the Taliban and its attempts to

justify the Taliban’s defiance of the aspirations of the

international community, including reprehensible attempts

at Taliban recognition, which has eroded Pakistan’s

reputation, causing its political isolation throughout the

world. Those who are aware of the Afghan situation and

the Afghan resolve to resist any foreign rule continue to be

perplexed and puzzled in the face of the Pakistani position.

However, despite Talibanism and Pakistan’s massive

military intervention in Afghanistan — both of which

represent obvious breaches of the United Nations Charter,

international law and international humanitarian law — we

are delighted to note that the United Nations, following

years of skepticism or illusory thinking, appears, perhaps

for the first time and only since the open escalation of

foreign military involvement in Afghanistan, to have

developed an in-depth perception of the longstanding bitter

reality of the Pakistani role, its intervention, and the Taliban

agenda in Afghanistan.

Yet to our dismay, while this in-depth perception has

been so long in developing, the plight of the Afghan nation

has remained unresolved. It is doomed to the terrible

predicament prevailing in many parts of Afghanistan: the

inadmissible acquisition of territory by force and

interference in its internal affairs. It is because of those

fundamental questions that at the outset of my statement I

raised the question of the survival of the United Nations as

an effective global institution. Given its approach to

Afghanistan, can we still put our hope in the United

Nations system for the resolution of the Afghan crisis or

other similar or dissimilar crises? It is our earnest

conviction that the litmus test for United Nations survival

will be its engagement, without any selectivity and in the

framework of the State system, in the rigorous

implementation and enforcement of its Charter.

Pakistan is blatantly breaching the United Nations

Charter, which explicitly requires all Member States to

refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial

integrity or political independence of any State, as well as

numerous General Assembly and Security Council

resolutions and other resolutions on terrorism and the use

of mercenaries. The reports of the Secretary-General, his

Special Envoy for Afghanistan and the United Nations

Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in

Afghanistan clearly bring to light the bellicose, obstinate

and intransigent attitude of the Taliban mercenaries.

In this context, the United Nations, acting through

the Security Council, has a duty to maintain international

peace and security, in accordance with the Charter. The

Pakistani aggression, State-sponsored terrorism and other

activities, which threaten the peace and security of the

region and hamper regional development and cooperation,

should be identified, condemned and dealt with by taking

appropriate measures.

Furthermore, the Islamic State of Afghanistan

earnestly expects the Security Council to consider the

imposition of immediate sanctions against both the

Taliban and their Pakistani mentors, in accordance with

paragraph 15 of Security Council resolution 1214 (1998)

of 8 December 1998 and in conformity with its

responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations.

The United Nations is also expected to use its good

offices to convince the Pakistani leadership, including its

military intelligence wing, the Inter-Services Intelligence

(ISI), to steer its policy away from intervention in

Afghanistan and towards non-intervention, so that we can

move from a Pakistani-dictated position of subordination

to a mutually dictated position of cooperation. The

Pakistani ISI should no longer thwart peace initiatives. A

first step in this regard would be the withdrawal from

Afghanistan of all armed Pakistanis, whether military

personnel or so-called religious volunteers. Pakistan

should also put a halt to its direct assistance to the

Taliban, ranging from military hardware and oil to

expertise and tactical advice. Only under such pressure

will the Taliban resume peace negotiations.

On the verge of the next millennium, the Islamic

State of Afghanistan genuinely hopes that, with the

resolution of the Afghan crisis, it will be able to serve as

a factor for peace and stability in the region, promoting

good-neighbourliness, mutual respect and cooperation and

acting as a transit country for trade between all its

neighbours, without any distinction or preference.

The United Nations is earnestly expected to step up

its efforts in the Afghan peace process. In this respect, we

greatly appreciate the untiring efforts of the Secretary-

General and Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, his Special

Envoy for Afghanistan. The Islamic State of Afghanistan

welcomes and fully supports the 19 July Tashkent

Declaration of the Member States that make up the “six

plus two” group, which it hopes will be fully observed.

Regrettably, the Taliban continue to voice their

adamant opposition not only to the Tashkent Declaration

but to all other peace initiatives. We sincerely welcome

paragraph 2 of the report of the Secretary-General

(A/54/378) of 21 September 1999, which states,

“it is noteworthy that only one week after the

Tashkent meeting, the Taliban began a major offensive

against the United Front in the Shomali plains, located

to the north of Kabul.”

Paragraph 3 further states,

“The Taliban insist that the UF [United Front] must

embrace the Emirate system while the UF question the

Taliban's popular mandate to make this demand.”

Mindful of the principle that there should be a

peaceful resolution of the conflict, the Islamic State of

Afghanistan earnestly desires a broad-based, fully

representative and multi-ethnic government in Afghanistan.

The Islamic State of Afghanistan, which is struggling for

sovereignty and the return of peace and normalcy through

the institution of such a government, earnestly aspires to the

resolution of fundamental issues such as the restoration of

and full respect for human rights in Afghanistan,

particularly the rights of women. Under the Taliban, women

have now been reduced to a voiceless and invisible state of

non-being, condemned to stay in their houses and stripped

of their basic rights, even the rights to work and education,

all of which is against the genuine tenets of Islam.

The Islamic State of Afghanistan welcomes the fact

that the first year of the new millennium will be observed

as the Year of Dialogue among Civilizations, as called for

by the Islamic Republic of Iran, and we believe that it will

prepare suitable ground for further understanding among the

global family, thereby contributing to collective human

civilization.

This century introduced a new paradigm based on

collective security and international organizations, concerted

approaches and international order, all based on the equal

sovereignty of States. From the United Nations Charter to

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the new

paradigm has affected all corners of the world. As a

troubled member of this global family, Afghanistan awaits

a collective endeavour by the international community to

deal with its problems, thereby helping the world, or at

least a part of the world, to become a better place for

humankind.

United Nations official records are in the public domain worldwide under administrative instruction ST/AI/189/Add.9/Rev.2.

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