Afghanistan, 1996

At the outset, allow

me, Sir, to express my delegation’s congratulations upon

your election to the high position of President of the

General Assembly at its fifty-first session.

The Afghan trauma, which was imposed by others

and endured by the Afghan people, continues to have

disturbing consequences for our nation. For the world, it

may be just another trouble spot. But for Afghans, it

means agony, pain, loss, psychological trauma and an

unknown future. We must not forget that there is still

hope. It lies in the international connection between me

and other representatives and, through them, to their

countrymen. The United Nations was built on that dream

and today, that connection is once again being made —

it is the fifty-first connection.

Two tragic dates will stand out in the recent history

of Afghanistan: 27 December 1979 and 27 September

1996. Both were black days that trigger bitter memories

in the minds of all patriotic Afghans. The first date

reminds them of the occupation by the former Soviet

Union and the second, of another occupying force, backed

by another neighbour.

The force occupying parts of our homeland today is

known as the Taliban — a name that became very

familiar to the General Assembly at the previous session.

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What was the Taliban’s first act when it captured Kabul? It

was to attack not a military garrison, but the United Nations

office in Afghanistan. Its first act was to breach the sanctity

of the United Nations compound, in violation of all

accepted international norms and laws.

That is the Taliban. As European Commissioner,

Emma Bonino, said yesterday, the Taliban is a force that

threatens to take Afghanistan back to the dark ages.

Numerous international media reports from Kabul draw a

picture of an organization supported from abroad, imposing

a draconian system on a terrified people. The Taliban have

ordered schools and universities to close and stopped all

education and employment for women. There are numerous

reports from the media, the United States authorities and

the United Nations on the role of the Taliban in a $75

billion heroin export industry in Afghanistan.

On 1 October 1996, The New York Times said that the

1 million people who live in Kabul alone had been plunged

into the

“labyrinth that is Taliban rule”.

On 3 October 1996 the Reuters news agency said that,

while the Taliban has tried to seek international recognition,

it has been greeted with “suspicion — and fear”. In just

their first week in Kabul, the Taliban earned the

condemnation of Amnesty International.

These are not the words of the Afghan Government

describing the Taliban occupation — these are the words of

Amnesty International:

“Despite statements from their leadership

suggesting moderation, it is clear that Taleban guards

are busily implementing a reign of terror in Kabul ...

Families are afraid to go out into the streets, afraid to

answer their doors, and afraid that their loved ones

will suffer the brutal consequence”

of Taliban rule. Amnesty International accuses the Taliban

of seizing, in house-to-house searches in the capital, up to

1,000 prisoners, who were forced to walk over the front-

line minefields.

French television showed the Taliban storming into the

Kabul museum, where they destroyed many artifacts, relics

and statues that were unique. Those artifacts and statues

belonged to the Buddhist era and are irreplaceable.

I am talking about the Taliban, which is

overwhelmed by foreign-fomented hatred, mandated by a

foreign-crafted agenda and committed to the annihilation

of the political, social and economic fabric of

Afghanistan. It is an organization whose display of terror

in Kabul breaks all records. In short, the Taliban are

mercenaries — an illegal and illegitimate force that has

been imposed on the Afghan people.

Once again, foreign interference is the main cause of

the continued conflict in Afghanistan. The current state of

terror and chaos, touching the lives of every living soul

in Kabul, is the direct consequence of that interference.

We have at our disposal hard evidence that we will

submit in due course to the Security Council for

appropriate consideration. What could prove that there is

foreign interference better than the foreign militias, which

include some officers, who were recently captured on the

battlefield by the armed forces of the Islamic State of

Afghanistan?

The Islamic State of Afghanistan firmly believes that

the so-called Taliban is a perfect example of a mercenary

force as defined by the International Convention against

the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of

Mercenaries, adopted by the General Assembly in 1989.

We are not denying the existence among the Taliban of

Afghan youths who were raised across the border and

attended religious schools there, but it cannot be stated

too clearly that the main corps of the Taliban military

staff consists of officers and militia forces from beyond

our borders, paid by military-industrial magnates trying to

overthrow the Islamic State of Afghanistan.

The United Nations General Assembly, on 21

December 1995, adopted a resolution which condemned

any State that permits or tolerates the recruitment,

financing, training, assembly, transit and use of

mercenaries with the objective of overthrowing the

Government of any State Member of the United Nations,

especially that of a developing country.

The Charter of the United Nations, in various

Articles, urges all Members to develop friendly relations

among themselves and to refrain in their international

relations from the threat or use of force against the

territorial integrity or political independence of any State.

On the occasion of the commemoration of the

twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations on 24

October 1970, the General Assembly approved the

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Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning

Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States. The first

principle declares that States shall refrain in their

international relations from the threat or use of force

against the territorial integrity or political independence of

any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the

purposes of the United Nations.

The Seventh Islamic Summit Conference in

Casablanca on 13 December 1994, the Conference of Heads

of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Countries on

18 October of 1995 in Cartagena de Indias, the General

Assembly resolution on Afghanistan of 19 December 1995

and the Twenty-third Islamic Conference of Foreign

Minsters on 9 December 1995 held in Conakry, Guinea, all

insist vigorously on the principle of non-intervention and

respect for the territorial integrity and independence of

Afghanistan and on a peace process based on genuine intra-

Afghan dialogue.

It is a matter of great disappointment that persistent

appeals to the United Nations made by the Islamic State of

Afghanistan to send a fact-finding mission to inquire into

and investigate the level, degree and nature of foreign

intervention in Afghanistan remain unanswered.

Last year, we presented facts about the Taliban from

this rostrum. Our plight went unheard. We are afraid, given

the accounts of documented facts by the press and our clear

stand on the legacy of the Taliban, that our plight might go

unheard once more. That will be even more catastrophic

than the Taliban take-over itself.

The latest reports, as recent as yesterday, reveal some

shocking realities and facts about the Taliban attacks on the

areas surrounding Kabul, the capital. Allow me to unveil

the screened and concealed crime that the Taliban, assisted

by their outside sponsors, committed very recently. Exactly

26 days ago, on 11 September 1996, intelligence sources of

the Defence Ministry of the Islamic State of Afghanistan

intercepted and recorded a Taliban radio transmission

between Nangarhar and Kandahar. That transmission says

the following:

“Give regards to the victorious Mullah Shukrullah ...

Tell him that new APR weapons have already been

brought to Kandahar. You should immediately send

these arms, which are gas weapons, through Torkhan

towards Nangarhar because we have organized a

group of Taliban with special gear and are waiting for

the said weapons. We can capture large areas with

a single round.”

On 17 September, just six days later, I personally

took this report, submitted to me by the Ministry of

Defence, and presented it to the State Supreme Council,

convened under the leadership of Mr. Rabbani, the

President of Afghanistan, in Blandage bunker, just north

of Kabul, the capital. I still remember an overwhelming

stillness occupied the room after I submitted the report.

After a brief calmness, a member of the Council

remarked that maybe the report had been passed around

to demoralize State troops; hence, not enough attention

was paid to the issue.

Yesterday, we obtained a shocking — and I repeat,

shocking — report from the headquarters of the

Government in Taloqan, which reminded me of the

Supreme Council meeting. Officials of the Islamic State

of Afghanistan recorded radio conversations by the

Taliban in the front line around evening on 26 September,

the night before the Taliban take-over of Kabul. The

following assurances were reported:

“Reassure the leaders that the new weapons have

had good results in Lata Band, Bande-Ghazi and

Puli-Charkhi.”

These areas, for the information of the

representatives, are located to the east of Kabul, the

capital.

More staggering realities are provided by the

eyewitness reports of those who saw the areas afterwards.

These eyewitnesses have reported that they saw most of

the corpses of the Government troops laying on the

ground without any sign of injury from a bullet or arsenal

penetration in their bodies. However, they did reveal that

they had noticed that the Government troops had bled

from their noses, eyes and ears. Mr. Muslim, a veteran

commander of the Government, who witnessed similar

situations during the Soviet occupation, has remarked that:

“The Taliban advance in the front line completely

surprised me. I then realized that the Taliban must

be in possession of some kind of weapons more

advanced than we had seen, possessed or known.”

Mr. Muslim, the commander, continues:

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“Chemical weapons hadn’t crossed my mind until

the evening of 26 September during the Taliban’s

fierce attack on Lata Band. I received a radio

transmission that a large number of our men were

being lost and even when I commanded the rest to

retreat, I heard no reply. I contacted my headquarters.

I was ordered to examine the front line. One hour had

passed since my initial contact with the front line

when I arrived there. Then I saw Commander Saboor,

lying dead on the battle ground. I only noticed blood

around his nose and ears. Saboor was a close friend of

mine. Suddenly, I had a flashback of the Red Army

using similar weapons during the jihad. I really

wanted to take his body, which had no trace of

external injury, back with me. But the intensity of

fighting did not give me the chance.”

Based on this account, it is the strong conviction of

the Islamic State of Afghanistan that the foreign sponsors

of the Taliban have provided them with some type of

internationally banned gas or chemical weapon which were

used in the Taliban onslaught for the capture of Kabul, the

capital, where they encountered strong resistance.

We are bringing this tragic episode to the attention of

this Assembly and therefore appeal to the international

community immediately to assign a team of inquiry to

investigate the case to which I have referred.

The Islamic State of Afghanistan has continuously

provided information to the United Nations Special Mission

and to the Security Council about the military acts of the

Taliban, which have systematically refused to accept the

United Nations peace process.

In a letter to the Secretary-General of the United

Nations dated 5 September 1995 (S/1995/767), the

Government of Afghanistan warned the international

community about the dangers of the fragmentation and

disintegration of Afghanistan and of the possibility of the

Taliban military advances getting out of control.

In the letter to the Secretary-General dated 14

September 1995, the Islamic State of Afghanistan

forecasted

“the outcome of this new tension as alarming and

perilous”

and earnestly called for the prompt dispatching

“of a fact-finding mission to western Afghanistan in

order to report during the consultations to the

Security Council”. (S/1995/795, p. 2)

The Secretary-General, in a letter dated 22

September 1995, assured that,

“The United Nations remains committed to the

sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan

and opposed to all external interference in your

country. I am using the mandates entrusted to me by

the Member States to do all I can to resolve the

sources of conflict which contribute to instability in

Afghanistan. I shall continue to pursue a

comprehensive approach to the overall peace

process, in which the Special Mission will continue

to play the main United Nations role. I ask that you

continue to cooperate with it.”

In a letter dated 27 September 1995 to the Secretary-

General, the Islamic State of Afghanistan stated that,

“Taliban not only undermined peace and

tranquillity in the western parts of the country, but

in the meantime, posed an external practical menace

to the territorial integrity of Afghanistan.”

(S/1995/823, annex, p. 3)

and that,

“the most reasonable and practical way to peace, and

appropriate atmosphere for a peaceful transfer of

power to an elected authority enjoying the

confidence of the people, is first and foremost the

need to ease off the present crisis of confidence'”.

(ibid.)

In the general debate of 4 October 1995, we declared

that attempts by

“reactionary groups to destabilize a moderate Islamic

system which believes in democracy and human

rights, are wrong in their assessments and

calculations. Such foreign circles may think that

after the usurpation of power by the Taliban all will

go well for them. In fact, they will add a further

problem, especially by bringing onto the scene a

faction which has no factual presence on

Afghanistan’s political scene. These circles should

be aware that the peace and security in the capital,

the actual relative peace and stability in the country

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and in the region, would be jeopardized by such an

erroneous miscalculation. The same error was made

by the former Soviet Union in 1979.” (Official

Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session,

Plenary Meetings, 19th meeting, p. 10)

As far as the activities of the United Nations Special

Mission are concerned, we suggested, in a letter dated 30

September 1995, that the efforts of the Secretary-General

“and those of Ambassador Mahmoud Mestiri, Head of

the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan,

would benefit from the establishment of a contact

group on Afghanistan composed of States, but not the

ones immediately involved, as well as of interested

organizations.” (A/50/510, annex, p. 2)

In a letter dated 12 October 1995, we warned that,

“The different leaders of the Taliban have several

times declared their rejection of the United Nations

Special Mission’s action in proposing to them to

accept a ceasefire. They have also rejected the

proposals for peace talks with other parties to the

conflict.” (S/1995/866, annex, p. 2)

In a letter dated 12 November 1995, we informed the

Secretary-General that,

“On 11 November 1995, the Taliban launched as

many as 170 rockets on the civilian-populated sectors

of Kabul, as a result of which 37 innocent lives were

lost and more than 52 civilians wounded, while

immense damage was inflicted upon public property.”

(A/50/748, annex, p. 2)

This is why in a letter dated 16 November 1995

(A/50/760) addressed to the Secretary General, the Islamic

State of Afghanistan inquired about the identity of the

Taliban, their ideology and goals, their rejection of the

peace process and their negative attitude towards the United

Nations.

As a result of the heavy bombardment of the capital

by the Taliban on 26 November 1995, the Secretary-

General expressed his concern about the escalation of

fighting and called upon all parties to cooperate with the

efforts of the United Nations Special Mission, then headed

by Ambassador Mahmoud Mestiri, aimed at achieving an

immediate ceasefire and promoting negotiations among the

parties on a transitional mechanism for the transfer of

power, to achieve a just and durable settlement acceptable

to all Afghans.

During 1996 Afghanistan continued to keep the

United Nations well informed about the atrocities

committed by the Taliban in a letter dated 19 January

1996 (S/1996/44).

On 9 April 1996 the Security Council held two

meetings on Afghanistan. During the meetings the

delegation of the Islamic State of Afghanistan provided

adequate information on the role of the so-called Taliban

in causing turmoil in Afghanistan and threatening the

peace and stability of the region. This was recognized by

the Security Council in a statement to the press on 13

December 1995.

In a letter dated 22 August 1996 addressed to the

Secretary General, the President of the Security Council

stated that the members of Security Council,

“express their strong view that the warring parties

should renounce the use of force and settle their

differences by peaceful means, through negotiations.

“The members of the Security Council are

convinced that the main responsibility for finding a

political solution to the conflict lies with the parties

and that all States must refrain from interference.”

(S/1996/683, first and second paragraphs)

The Taliban have consistently taken a rejectionist

attitude and still act against the letter and the spirit of all

Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and

decisions.

Given this account, I must say that this is the time

to look back and see who is responsible for the ongoing

human tragedy in Afghanistan. Was it not the lack of any

appropriate response by this Organization to the

intransigent attitude of the Taliban that encouraged and

enabled them to see the tunnel wide open and to pursue

their designs crafted by military-industrial magnates from

abroad?

The Islamic State of Afghanistan had continuously

warned the United Nations about the possible outcome.

Who is to blame, and could we consider it a conspiracy

of indifference or a conspiracy of victimization?

Regardless of which one it may be, the blood of Afghans

has been spilled. One thing manifested by the indifference

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thus far is that Afghan blood is not cheap; rather, it is

worthless.

Let us go back to the drastic events that took place

during the last couple of weeks. The Government forces

evacuated the capital in order to prevent a bloodbath. The

Taliban invaded Kabul on the morning of 27 September

1996. The Government authorities relocated their

headquarters and offices in Taloqan, the capital of the

northern province of Takhar.

Resistance against the Taliban is not limited only to

the Panjshir Valley, where the Taliban are conducting

widespread and extensive battles, targeting civilian areas. In

many other parts of Afghanistan, under the rule of the

Taliban, there exists the potential for resistance. Soon we

will hear about uprisings.

In today’s circumstances, the objectives of the Islamic

State of Afghanistan have not changed, and I would like to

emphasize once again our firm commitment to General

Assembly resolution 50/88 on Afghanistan, which was

adopted by consensus on 19 December 1995.

The provisional setback of one party in the conflict

and the territorial gain of one side could not mean that

peace would prevail in the country. Military occupation

cannot bring about conflict resolution. On the contrary, the

escalation of tension once again necessitates a negotiated

settlement of the conflict through the mechanism

formulated in operative paragraph 4 of resolution 50/88 B

of 19 December 1995. This provides a solution to the crisis

in Afghanistan through the United Nations peace process.

A ranking United Nations official expressed his

concern by stating in The Los Angeles Times of 5 October

1996,

“It’s frightening [that] this is going to be the

Government, because these men have obviously had

no experience but fighting.”

The Taliban, who have invaded the capital city of

Kabul with cross-border military assistance, will not be able

to ensure the national unity of Afghanistan, especially in

the light of what they have done during the first days of

their military rule in the capital. The Taliban, in spite of

being Pashtuns, neither agree with the majority of Pashtuns

of the country nor with Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Turkmen,

Baluchis, Nooristanis and others.

The Afghan leaders, intellectuals and scholars cannot

agree with the regressive and backward views of the

Taliban. Many religious leaders of the country do not

approve of their attitude and deem it incompatible with

the needs of Muslims in the modern world. They all

consider them unacceptable tools of foreign intervention.

The military rule of the Taliban must not be

considered final or accomplished. Those foreign quarters

which have provided financial and military assistance to

the Taliban will not be able to subsidize and finance their

rule permanently.

The Taliban are lacking any vision or ability for the

objective of economic and social rehabilitation in

Afghanistan. They lack any coherent and systematic

thinking or projection of the vast needs of today’s

Afghanistan. Many of their leaders consider the teachings

of modern science and technology contrary to religion.

They consider science to be sacrilege. The Taliban, who

still believe the earth is flat, are not the people for

Afghanistan, not when we are about to enter the twenty-

first century.

Yet the outside sponsors of the Taliban are

attempting to cover up their actual identity and nature,

thus soliciting a kind of legitimacy for this illegitimate,

obscurantist and terrorist group. Any relation established

with the Taliban may be interpreted by the Taliban as

tolerance by the international community. Allowing this

to happen would be an affront to the principles of the

United Nations, a seal of approval for terrorism, a

legitimization of foreign intervention and, indeed, an

insult to the human conscience.

In the name of the Islamic State of Afghanistan and

the victimized Afghan nation, I express gratitude to all

those countries that have expressed their concern and

disapproval of the occupation of the Afghan capital,

Kabul, by the Taliban, and the rule of terror in that city.

Days after the occupation of Kabul, on 2 October

1996, the Coordination Meeting of Foreign Ministers of

the member States of the Organization of the Islamic

Conference (OIC), at which I had the honour to speak,

convened at the United Nations in New York. In a final

communiqué, they expressed

“the hope that the Afghan parties will peacefully

resolve their political differences and collectively

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work for the restoration of peace and stability in the

country”.

The practical solution to the Afghan problem needs to

include the following elements, in conformity with General

Assembly resolution 50/88 B of 19 December 1995 on the

question of Afghanistan: first, an immediate cessation of

armed conflict and the declaration of a ceasefire; secondly,

an invitation to all Afghan parties to the negotiating table,

under the auspices of the United Nations and with the

cooperation of the OIC; thirdly, an agreement on the

composition and establishment of a transitional Government

of national unity and the creation of a credible, authoritative

body to which power would immediately be transferred;

and, fourthly, the consolidation of the political process in

order to ascertain the views of the people and solve the

problem through elections or through the convening of the

traditional Grand Assembly.

Our basic views and main objectives are as follows:

the re-establishment of peace and stability, along with the

creation of conditions conducive to ensuring that the

peoples of Afghanistan can live, in an atmosphere of law

and order, on the basis of democratic values and respect for

human rights, as required by an authentic and truthful

vision of high Islamic principles; and the establishment of

a strong central Government on the basis of agreement

among all Afghan sides that have the capacity to mobilize

masses and are able to secure the achievement of these

goals. This will allow Afghanistan to become once again a

positive factor for peace and stability in the region to which

it belongs.

Only a transitional Government of national unity

would be able to secure the national unity of the country

and to allow the launching of the major task of

reconstructing and rehabilitating Afghanistan. Such a goal

could not be achieved without the full participation of the

intellectuals, scientists, experts and technocrats of

Afghanistan, many of whom now live abroad. We are

expecting all countries that are in favour of peace and

stability in Afghanistan to assist our people in order to

achieve these noble objectives.

Upon adopting the Charter of the United Nations 51

years ago in the city of San Francisco, the founding fathers

of this global establishment declared the United Nations to

be based on the sovereign equality of all States. They did

this at a time when this principle was an ideal. The struggle

for freedom by many nations, together with millions of

sacrifices, on the one hand, and the need in the twentieth

century for natural interdependence between the members

of this global family, on the other, proved more than ever

the righteousness of this principle.

It is apropos in this connection to quote His

Excellency Mr. Hervé de Charette, the Foreign Minister

of France, who on 25 September stated from this rostrum:

“If we are not careful, we are going to be living in

a world without criteria, without values, without

references, in which some — the strongest and

richest — will be in a position to decide alone on

the future of the planet.” (Official Records of the

General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, Plenary

Meetings, 8th meeting, p. 18)