New Zealand, 1994

I should like, first,

to congratulate Mr. Amara Essy of Côte d’Ivoire on his

well-deserved election as President of the General

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Assembly at its forty-ninth session and to convey to him

our good wishes for every success in his work.

The general debate is our chance, as Members of the

United Nations, to undertake together an annual review of

the Organization’s work - its successes and its failures -

and to identify collectively the issues we want to focus on.

With the fiftieth anniversary next year, there is a pressing

need to do so. That will be the occasion to chart our new

priorities for the twenty-first century.

Our responses to some of today’s challenges and

tragedies have ranged from excellent but often

under-reported to woefully inadequate and, consequently,

defiantly reported.

The peoples of the world want to believe in the United

Nations and what it should achieve. If, however, within

some parts of the Organization we are bereft of purpose

and intentions this golden anniversary threatens to be less

joyous and more muted than many of us anticipated.

New Zealand has a strong vested interest in the United

Nations success, as do most small States. The New

Zealand people have always believed in the United Nations,

in a collective approach to the resolution of global and

regional problems. This has been demonstrated by strong

support for the United Nations by successive Governments.

From our experience of - and I do not hesitate to say

this - a turbulent two years on the Security Council and as

a committed founder Member of the Organization, I would

like to take this opportunity to offer some observations

about the problems we see as players in the collective

decision-making process.

When New Zealand took part in the founding of the

United Nations we and many others saw our primary

purpose as providing for a system of collective security.

Until very recently that was little more than a vision. With

the end of the confrontation between two super-Power

blocs, the goal of "the organized common peace", of which

President Woodrow Wilson spoke so eloquently three

generations ago, presents itself. We must not let it slip

from our grasp this time. It will, however, take real effort

and real determination.

Collective security, or working together, is the

cornerstone of the security of small States. Today they are

the overwhelming majority of the membership of this

Organization. New Zealanders recognize that peace is

indivisible, that remoteness is certainly no safeguard: a

problem in any part of the world can ripple to the Earth’s

farthest corners. While we are the country probably most

distant from the Balkans conflict, we have sent an

enhanced company of soldiers to help in efforts to ease

suffering and, I earnestly hope with the will of the parties

involved, one day bring peace throughout the former

Yugoslavia.

For the same reasons, our defence personnel can be

found engaged in peace-support operations in Africa, the

Middle East, Asia and most recently Haiti. And there are

New Zealand nurses, firefighters and aid workers spread

around the globe in support.

Against this backdrop, however, New Zealanders are

puzzled at times by the way in which the United Nations

carries out some of its important tasks. In Bosnia, despite

the employment of what is by any standards a large, well-

armed and well-trained force, people see on their

television screens nightly the frustration of the United

Nations Protection Force by small groups of irregulars, a

single policeman or even small groups of non-combatants.

In Haiti they witnessed a boat full of Blue Berets turned

away by a small group of pistol-toting thugs

unconvincingly called "attachés".

And what can one say about the appalling tragedy in

Rwanda? How can so much hatred have been unleashed

so viciously, killing hundreds of thousands? What we

watched with horror on our television screens was

destruction on a scale we thought only megaton bombs

were capable of. The systematic slaughter of men,

women and children simply because of their ethnic origin

leaves us all outraged.

There are no easy answers. But the first key to

unlocking the possibilities for a genuine collective

security must be the proper application of the United

Nations Charter. We have to decide at exactly what point

the United Nations should get involved in the

peacemaking operation. Do we recognize a problem, and,

if we do, is the preventive diplomacy that we so firmly

believe in occurring?

In my view, we have to follow the intention of the

Charter. First, at the outset of a crisis, or even the signs

of a crisis, we have to make more serious efforts through

that preventive diplomacy to resolve problems and

conflicts by negotiation. Efforts must be made at an early

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stage to address the root causes of conflicts by the Security

Council’s exercising all its responsibilities under Chapter VI

of the Charter.

However, on some occasions, in these days of modern

media technology, we face the dilemma caused by the

divergence between what the public perceives as happening

and what is the reality. Extensive media coverage puts

pressure on for immediate response. In the case of

Rwanda, that was appropriate. In other circumstances, the

media oversimplify and ignore the fact that conditions on

the ground are chaotic and United Nations resources are

over-stretched.

A second area where the Charter could be more

carefully applied is when disputes are first placed before

the Council. I believe it should give affected States an

adequate hearing before addressing the problem behind

closed doors. Our experience on the Security Council

suggests the investment in openness that would be achieved

by developing a practice of collectively hearing directly

from the parties involved would be worthwhile, even if it

were done only informally.

In the same vein, the Charter specifically contemplates

the involvement, without vote, of troop-contributing

countries in significant decisions. New Zealand has pressed

this issue for some time, but so far with limited success.

The time is coming, in fact, when the General Assembly

will have to address the question if the Security Council

does not respond adequately to the concerns that have been

raised.

Under the Charter, much is expected of the Council’s

permanent members. There is no doubt that they can and

do contribute greatly to the work of the United Nations.

Leadership and sacrifices by the large Powers were, for

example, instrumental in successfully challenging

aggression against the small State of Kuwait three-and-a-

half years ago.

I emphasize again, however, the importance of the

collective nature of decision-making in the Security

Council. Making distinctions between the views of the

"P5" and the rest is not really healthy. The Council is a

team of 15. It must work together, and by that I mean

giving full weight to the views of all its members. The

strength of the Security Council is enhanced each year by

the vigorous enthusiasm brought by new members on 1

January, testing what may have become an accepted

second-best.

I would remind the Assembly that the Charter

clearly envisages that the norm for operations to maintain

international peace and security will be United Nations

operations. National operations are not ruled out, of

course. I wish therefore to highlight and question recent

trends toward coalitions under national command, and the

implications for the collective security needs of small and

distant countries where no strategic interest is involved.

However, the Security Council will be judged on its

effectiveness. Successes, hopefully, will outweigh

failures, but we all have an obligation to improve the

success rate. I am an enthusiastic supporter of improving

our success rate, but much of that will come down to the

way in which issues are managed. And it is that question

of the management of issues that I wish to address.

In our experience, the key is to use management

tools based on proven modern public- and private-sector

experience. This is very valuable. What are these tools?

And how do we apply them to the conduct of peace-

keeping operations?

I would suggest that there are six critical elements:

first, a sustainable financial system; secondly, a

transparent political accountability; thirdly, clear

objectives that incorporate regular reviews; fourthly, a

clear, unambiguous command and control structure;

fifthly, a credible legal regime that guarantees the security

of United Nations personnel; and, sixthly, the availability

of resources so that objectives can be met quickly and

efficiently.

Let me go back to that first point, a sustainable

financial system. There is no doubt that the Organization

is facing a financial crisis that cannot be ignored. We

have had serious problems with reserves and we have

significant debt to contributing countries. The largest

contributor has indicated that it will unilaterally reduce its

share of funding from October next year. The situation

is not sustainable. It requires urgent action.

Why do we have this crisis? There are some simple

answers. Some members cannot pay; others will not pay;

and some are arguing the legitimacy of their assessment.

The General Assembly, this body, must confront this

issue. The United Nations must stop extending credit to

non-payers. There is enough evidence emerging to

suggest that there may be serious inequities in the present

system.

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Some countries with extraordinarily strong growth

over the past 5 to 10 years appear in the revised scale

issued by the Committee on Contributions with a constant

or even reduced contribution level. That is not acceptable.

It must be remedied.

We do not want a hollow celebration on the fiftieth

anniversary with a cash crisis hanging over the

Organization. We must make a commitment to resolve this

crisis before the conclusion of the forty-ninth session.

The next point is the need for political accountability.

There is in my view a parallel priority to develop and

improve the Organization’s capacity for undertaking its

collective security responsibilities. To do that we need to

put in place more transparent procedures throughout the

Organization. The management of peace-keeping

operations is allocated to the Secretariat. This is necessary

and appropriate in the same way any Government delegates

responsibility for a complex operation to its public service.

However, and I speak as a politician and as a Minister

responsible for the management and oversight of

Government departments, the days are long gone when a

public service mandarin could run a department or major

operation without detailed political oversight. This is not

a promotion of micro-management, nor am I implying any

criticism of the Secretariat staff. But as any politician

holding executive office in today’s democracies knows, the

classic recipe for a failed project is for those who are

politically accountable to lose track of implementation or to

lose the game plan.

We saw that all too clearly in the past year in

Somalia. Ironically, the Security Council had, in resolution

814 (1993), already foreseen the need in the case of the

United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) for a

detailed political accountability and provided for a

committee to follow the operation closely. But the

committee was never established.

New Zealand has proposed in the Security Council

that a committee or an ad hoc working group should be

established to fill this gap and enhance the accountability of

the Organization to its politically responsible

representatives. I certainly remain hopeful that progress

can be made in this area.

The third point I draw to the attention of members is

the need for clear objectives with regular reviews. Clearer

mission objectives must be developed and kept under

review. I am delighted that some progress has in fact been

made. The Council is now identifying more closely the

terms of mandates for United Nations operations, and it

is becoming usual to build a specific review cycle into its

mandates. But there are still two areas of weakness.

First, there is a great deal of mythology about and

very little sound analysis of the circumstances in which

force should be used by United Nations operations. Many

believe this is governed by the use or non-use of the

words "Chapter VII". This could well be a false

conclusion. The rules of engagement rather than abstract

reference to the Charter are much more likely to

determine actual behaviour in the field.

I am not alone in believing that there is a need to

develop greater commonality in military doctrine for

United Nations peace-keeping operations. This is

especially relevant when so many peace-keeping

contributors are regularly placed side by side in the field.

It is, however, particularly urgent in the face of new-style

operations of the intra-country type where the use of force

by factions, not necessarily Governments, is the challenge

for this body to overcome.

It is clear that common principles are necessary to

guide peace-keepers on the appropriate use of force when

they take part in operations in pursuit of an agreed United

Nations strategic objective. As for the review, while

there are plenty of mid-term reviews there is, as yet, no

systematic process of review at the end of an operation.

The budget of every peace-keeping operation should

include provision, as a principal line item, for the

preparation of a comprehensive review of the operation’s

achievements relative to the mandate set.

Such reviews should be separate from the financial

performance review and should address the substance of

the operation and seek to identify all relevant lessons for

the conduct of future operations.

I address now the question of command and control.

There is a weakness in the command and control

structures and they do need attention. It is true the

personnel of national defence forces which contribute

forces to the United Nations legally remain in their

country’s national service. But as I see it, parallel to the

allocation of responsibility to the United Nations Force

Commander must be a recognition that the national

command structure will not seek to direct their forces in

operational matters. If the national command authority

has serious difficulties, then the appropriate course of

action in all cases - except an emergency - is for the issue

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to be resolved with United Nations Headquarters. If

resolution is not possible the unit should be withdrawn.

I come to the question of the safety of peace-keeping

personnel. A major requirement for effective collective

security is that countries contributing troops and civilian

personnel should have confidence that their personnel in the

field will have the best possible support to ensure their

safety and security. That is an issue which, as many

members know, New Zealand has pursued relentlessly

during its time on the Council. It bears on the level of

equipment with which the forces are outfitted and there is

plenty of room for improvement.

In addition, the legal regime under which peace-

keeping operations are conducted needs to reflect the

extraordinary personal risk which United Nations personnel

are undertaking on behalf of us all in carrying out collective

security operations. It is right that such personnel should

be differentiated from soldiers in an armed conflict and that

there should be a higher standard of legal responsibility for

anybody who attacks them. I urge all members of the

Assembly to support New Zealand’s initiative on this issue

currently in the Sixth Committee, that the necessary

flexibility be shown on outstanding issues and that we make

a really determined effort to complete work on the draft

convention this year.

The question of resources is always before us. In my

sixth point I would say that a critical tool for effective

collective security is a strategy for resource availability.

The situation we all saw recently in Rwanda is a classic

case. Human resources were available but they lacked

training and they lacked equipment. But there is also the

need for a capacity in all peace-keeping operations for a

forceful response in self-defence. There are important

lessons to be learned from the troop losses in Rwanda last

April and again I draw attention to the linkage between

mandates, rules of engagement, doctrine and planning.

The United Nations will have to go beyond the current

work being done on stand-by forces to address this

problem.

We believe that there is a case for redirecting a

substantial portion of bilateral military assistance into forms

of training that would better assist defence forces with the

requirements of peace-keeping operations.

There is also a role for the United Nations maintaining

the physical equivalent of the peace-keeping reserve fund

that it is supposed to have on the financial side now. A

quick start-up capability, with owned or leased equipment

immediately available to the United Nations, would have

made a significant difference in the Rwanda situation.

This is a practical and feasible step that can be taken to

ensure that future collective security can in fact rise to the

challenge.

I have spoken about the factors that need to be taken

into account in managing peace-keeping operations. I

now wish to address the terms of their engagements.

The United Nations should not be expected to take

responsibility for a situation of up to 30 years because the

parties to a conflict are unable or unwilling to summon up

the necessary political will to reach a settlement. There

comes a point when the parties must take their fate in

their own hands rather than the Council avoiding the hard

decisions just by rolling over the mandates.

At the same time, a range of different considerations

should prevail when the United Nations reaches the end

of a successful peace-keeping process. The United

Nations cannot simply walk away when a perceived end

point - such as an election - has been achieved, because

there may still be outstanding issues that need the

ongoing support of the operation, such as humanitarian

operations or local capability-building programmes to help

provide the required sound administration.

The United Nations deserves congratulations on its

achievements in Cambodia, for example, but the future

there is still not certain, and the United Nations must

maintain its responsibilities. Rehabilitation in that country

must continue.

Another example of a situation in which

peacemaking and peace-building have to be seen as a

coherent whole is in the area of demining. This is a

critically important humanitarian function. New

Zealand’s military forces have had a lot of experience in

helping the United Nations with demining in Afghanistan,

Cambodia and, most recently, Mozambique.

The Security Council Mission that visited

Mozambique about two months ago reported its dismay

at the delays and at the state of the programme generally.

At the request of the United Nations, New Zealand

stepped in early in August and began the rescue effort for

the programme. The wheel should not have had to be

reinvented. It is a concern that lessons learned from

earlier operations such as Afghanistan and Cambodia do

not appear to be retained. Having seen firsthand the

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effects of mines in Cambodia, I do believe we should move

more expeditiously than the speed of the present

performance.

New Zealand certainly looks forward to working with

other delegations to improve performance in this area, and

I would certainly add that my Government was most

interested in the comments President Clinton made here

yesterday about the proposal for the elimination of the

world’s 85 million anti-personnel land-mines. This is an

urgent task. No one who has seen firsthand the human cost

of mines can offer anything less than full cooperation to

this end.

Finally, when we look ahead to what would really

enhance proper use of the collective security powers, we

have to conclude that reform of the Security Council is a

major task waiting to be fulfilled. Many of the things I

have discussed today require reforms by the Security

Council, or at least in conjunction with it. But I cannot

escape the conclusion that even if all of these were

accomplished, the political legitimacy of the Security

Council could still erode over a period of time. Ultimately

it could lose the credibility vital to the role it carries out.

Collective security requires the Council to be

genuinely representative of the entire United Nations

membership. We have, of course, as many others have

done, followed the debate on Security Council reform in the

Open-ended Working Group set up last year. We hear the

case made for additional permanent members. We also

hear overwhelming support for expanding the number of

non-permanent members of the Council. There are shades

of difference on the numbers for the total membership, but

consensus does seem to be emerging around five or six new

members. We consider that a limited expansion of the

number of members, paying regard to an equitable

geographical participation, is still a priority for the health

of the Organization. It is time to do what is achievable and

what benefits most Members. Given the need for 122

ratifications, we are aware that even a simple expansion,

hopefully adopted next year, will take several years to come

into force. It would not be unrealistic, therefore, for the

year 2000 to see the first meeting of the expanded Council.

There is no worth in being critical of some aspects of

the United Nations without believing, as I do, that the

problems can be cured. We, all 184 of us, are its doctors,

and we need to act quickly. We need to apportion our

costs fairly and systematically. We need to share peace-

keeping tasks, peace-keeping funding and peace-keeping

supplies. We need to accept the democratic decisions of

this Organization. We also need to adjust to the more

complex and interrelated United Nations agendas of the

future.

I therefore leave with the Assembly New Zealand’s

assurance of a renewed commitment to this unique and

essential body and of our willingness to work in that

spirit to ensure the continued relevance of the United

Nations for the next half-century.