Kingdom of the Netherlands, 2001

How can anyone

stand on the smoking ashes of “ground zero” and not

be overwhelmed by disbelief, anger, and frustration?

How can anyone escape the enormity of what happened

in September or not feel compassion for all those who

have lost someone dear to them? At “ground zero” we

not only witness death and destruction, but we also see

how American values have come under siege. These

are shared values. That is why the people I represent

now stand squarely behind the United States.

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No matter how deeply moved we may be, we

must look beyond our anger and frustration. Through

our tears, we should discover opportunity. Through our

bitterness, necessity. We must turn compassion into

solidarity, turn solidarity into common action. We need

a plan — in sum, we must turn to the United Nations.

The reaction on the part of the United Nations

from the beginning of this crisis has been prompt and

responsible. As we meet this week, we must try and

keep the momentum going. And that is precisely what

we are doing. There is something I have sensed in the

first few days of this general debate — namely,

determination — determination to use the United

Nations to the fullest, on many different fronts, as a

centre of gravity for our common actions — common

action for confronting a global threat — common

action to maintain the international order.

With regard to that common action, what have we

learned so far? Three lessons. Lesson number one: the

law must be firmly in place. There is a wealth of legal

rules to guide us in these difficult times, and more of

them are on the way. A striking example of innovative

rule-making was presented by the Security Council.

Binding under Chapter VII of the United Nations

Charter, resolution 1373 (2001) takes action not in

regard to a specific threat or breach of the peace, not

against a particular Member State, but takes action to

confront a phenomenon, a threat to our human values

and economic interests — action against unidentified

enemies. By writing new law, the Council has broken

new ground. Even more so, as it has set up the

Counter-Terrorism Committee to monitor the

implementation of its decision.

Jointly with our partners in the European Union,

we are taking the implementation of resolution 1373

(2001) very seriously. One aspect of it is especially

important to us: promoting ratification of all of the

various anti-terrorism conventions and monitoring

compliance. My country has some expertise to offer

and will gladly share it. Meanwhile, an overarching

convention against terrorism is in the works. That is

good. But we are getting bogged down over a

definition of terrorism. That is bad. Let us not forget

that it took us 20 years to produce a fairly useless

definition of aggression. The world cannot wait that

long. Besides, when terrorism stares you in the face,

you’ll know it.

In addition to rule-making, the real challenge lies

in implementation. There, we should try harder. Let me

give you one example. Just before the summer we lost

our momentum in the fight against biological warfare,

and therefore the fight against bio-terrorism as well.

The world is a scary place. Anthrax is only one motive

for retrieving that momentum. Let us resume our

efforts to turn the Biological Weapons Convention into

an instrument that can really make a difference.

The need for stepping up security is immediate,

comprehensive and self-evident. In the aftermath of 11

September, nobody would deny it. But we need to be

concerned with the downside of security as well. Parts

of our value system may come under pressure when

Governments seek to bolster public safety, and by this I

mean human rights and fundamental freedoms. As

private citizens we must be ready to make concessions

and, yes, we will be forced to relinquish some freedom

from intrusion in our private lives. But we cannot be

expected to live in a never-ending state of siege.

Wherever we have to strike a balance, we have to do so

wisely. Long ago, we drew a line beyond which we

cannot step — we cannot detract from the basic

principles of human rights. Those principles are the

true measure of our evolution and our civilization. If

we look the other way, we lose the moral high ground.

If we compromise, we lose out to those who besiege us.

What is being put to the test here is our own

value system. The core notion of that system is

tolerance. Tolerance must, however, come from all

sides. Tolerance is not the equivalent of giving in to

intolerance. It does not imply that you bend at the

slightest pressure. Tolerance means that you stand up to

be counted, that you draw a line in the sand when your

basic values are challenged. That is lesson number one.

Lesson number two: there are “black holes” in the

international order: failing States. We knew they were

there all along, but we have never been quite sure how

to deal with them. Why should we care about failing

States? For several reasons. Look at the avalanche of

drugs, drug-money, weapons, and warlords spilling out

of Afghanistan. Look at the blood diamonds streaming

out of Africa. Think of how failing States attract

parasites and how they turn into breeding grounds for

terrorism, a haven for international crime. Think of

peace and security, too; of how faltering countries

become a liability to their own people; of how they

flaunt the rules of the game and become a liability to

the whole neighbourhood.

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How do we deal with failing States? That

question has never been answered in a systematic

manner. Any answer begins by recognition on the part

of the Member States of this Organization that failing

States are a problem. Indeed, it may turn out to be the

most pernicious problem of the new century. From that

point on, we need to build a strategy, and do so

together, within the framework of this Organization.

What are we aiming at? How ambitious are we?

Can we get in early to prevent failing States from

failing? Are there any early warning signals to look out

for? If we see those signals, do we have the means to

act? And the political will? Once States are failing, do

we try and fix them? Do we settle for ending the

fighting, wherever fighting is going on? Or do we limit

ourselves to humanitarian aid? These are all difficult

questions.

My belief is that outside intervention only goes so

far. I do not believe that massive injections of aid are

the right answer to failing States. For one thing, donors

are reluctant to poor money down a black hole. But

more importantly: the solution should not come from

the outside, but rather from the inside. Even in the

poorest country we will find well-educated citizens just

as committed to building better lives for their children

as in the rest of the world. They need a helping hand in

building good governance and a viable civil society.

Yet, ownership is paramount. Failing States, too, have

the capacity to fix themselves. Indeed, only if they fix

themselves will they no longer fail. Our role should be

to help galvanize and to enable those capacities.

Lesson number three: the United Nations should

be doing the right things. As of today the Northern

Alliance has entered the city of Kabul. That fact makes

it even more imperative that we speak about

Afghanistan in the United Nations.

Consensus is growing that in post-Taliban

Afghanistan, the United Nations should play a central

role. I certainly support that view. But a central role in

what? For make no mistake: once the bombing stops,

the difficulties are still overwhelming. The country is

not only rugged and ruined, but also the size of Central

Europe and packed with landmines. Factional fighting

is bound to continue. The United Nations can do a lot,

but we need to beware of sending the United Nations

on an impossible mission. Instead of calling on the

United Nations for functions where it is weak, let us

call on the United Nations for functions where it is

strong.

For example, take governance, a major worry to

us all. Much as we seek to avoid it, a political vacuum

is a realistic prospect, given that tribal conflict in

Afghanistan is as old as the country’s history. Afghans

are a proud people. Hostility towards outside

intervention is strong. The country needs to be

governed from within. We may be looking both for a

broad-based interim Government and for a stable

permanent structure. Without rushing to elections, we

need to be satisfied that such a political settlement is

supported by the population. In the process, the United

Nations might play a central role as a catalyst and as an

adviser, but not as a governor. Afghanistan is not East

Timor. It is important, too, that any settlement be

supported by the neighbouring States and by a Security

Council resolution.

As regards security: in the absence of a functional

national army, transitional military arrangements are

essential. They are essential to create a secure

environment enabling reconstruction to begin and

refugees to return home. Choosing the right format is

critical. A conventional United Nations peacekeeping

operation may not be a good idea — certainly not for

the country as a whole. Supplying peacekeepers is still

voluntary. Realistically, the troop levels needed for a

country this size would almost certainly not be

attained. Bosnia has taught us the hard lesson of the

price we pay when we send in a United Nations force

that is below par. We should be careful to avoid another

Somalia. Different formats for security arrangements

are possible, and we should reflect on them as a whole.

In a previous context, Ambassador Brahimi has offered

us a wide spectrum of lessons learned about United

Nations peacekeeping. We should take them to heart.

Now, as the Special Representative, he deserves all the

support he needs from us.

Concerning mine clearance: Afghanistan has

more landmines than any other country in the world.

The country cannot possibly get back on its feet as long

as those mines are there. We have to get rid of them,

and the United Nations can help us to do that. We must

pay the bills.

As to reconstruction: we should capitalize on

where the United Nations is uniquely positioned either

to deploy operations in the field or to coordinate those

of others. Let us not limit our view to the part of the

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United Nations here in New York, but rather broaden it

to the entire United Nations system, including the

Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods institutions. We

need to bring the full weight of that system to bear on

the future of Afghanistan. I am speaking of the World

Health Organization and the Office of the United

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, of the Food

and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

and the United Nations Drug Control Programme, of

the International Labour Organization and the World

Food Programme, of the United Nations Development

Programme and the World Bank. There is no need to

set up a whole new mechanism. The Afghanistan

Support Group is fully entrenched, and we should use

it.

Especially now, caught in the crossfire, the

Afghan people are not to be envied. Their plight will

not be over once the guns are silent. Food stocks,

health care, housing, utilities, schooling, agriculture —

the list of concerns is a long one. But all of us need to

push that agenda. We may not be part of the problem of

Afghanistan, but we must be part of the solution.

Yet again, reconstruction cannot be imposed upon

a nation. Here, too, a sustainable recovery needs to

come from within. All the men, and especially the

women of Afghanistan, must once again become the

makers of their own fate and future. The answer lies

with them.

The United Nations is not merely “an ineffective

acronym”, as a misguided message on the Internet

would have you believe. For global issues, multilateral

cooperation is the only answer. Multilateralism is

solidarity worked into a plan. As I said, the reaction by

the United Nations system in the aftermath of 11

September has been prompt and responsible. In order

to maintain that level of performance, we, the Member

States, will have to show the stamina, support and

commitment to make it happen. Our track record is not

impeccable. The United Nations can go no faster than

we will let it, which means we have to make it work.

This also means we have to provide it with all the

resources, and the political will, to give it the push and

punch we need.